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INTRODUCTION
Individuals do not always respond to regulation as Homo
economicus, and administrative agencies have finally begun to
notice.1 The fact that individuals deviate in predictable ways
from neoclassical assumptions of rationality has been widely
recognized in the academic literature and has become well
known to the public. 2 But only recently has it begun to shape
regulatory policy. 3 Agencies have begun to develop regulations
1.
2.

RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 6 (2008).
See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL, at xx (2008); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.

REV. 1471, 1471 (1998); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values,
and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341 (1984); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 11 (1998).

3. For recent accounts in popular literature, see Dan Charles, Leaping
the Efficiency Gap, 325 SCIENCE 804 (2009), and Michael Grunwald, How Obama Is Using the Science of Change, TIME, Apr.13, 2009, at 28.
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and policies that reflect the insights of behavioral economics, 4
and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has introduced behavioral economics to White House review of agency
regulations. 5 As a result, the influence of behavioral economics
on agency decisionmaking is likely to grow substantially. Regulation has entered the behavioral era.
Although behavioral research is often referred to as "behavioral economics," economists are not the only sources of insight for making regulation sensitive to the ways in which individuals depart from the traditional rational-actor model.
Somewhat overshadowed in the public and policymaking world
are the important insights of other fields within the behavioral
and social sciences. These insights suggest, for example, that it
may be as important for regulators to account for descriptive
and prescriptive norms as for the insights of behavioral economics, such as framing, hyperbolic discounting, loss aversion,
and so on.6 Taken together, the behavioral and social sciences
4. See, e.g., Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to the Honorable David Strickland, Adm'r, Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
postreview/TireFuelEfficiencyConsumerInformationFinalRule.pdf
(encouraging the Agency to complete comprehensive studies that reflect principles of behavioral economics, such as promoting easy comparison shopping).
5. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND

TRIBAL ENTITIES 35 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
flles/omb/assets/legislativejreports/2009 finalBCReport_01272010.pdf ("OMB
recommends consideration of behaviorally informed approaches to regulation.
Such approaches, rooted in several decades of work in social science, can serve
to improve rules by incorporating insights that come from relaxing assumptions usually invoked in neoclassical economic theory. With an accurate understanding of human behavior, agencies would be in a position to suggest innovative, effective, and low-cost methods of achieving regulatory goals."); see
also Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 1 (June 18, 2010)
[hereinafter 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo], available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/fles/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure-principles.pdf
(providing
"guidance to inform the use of disclosure and simplification in the regulatory
process").
6. Behavioral economics incorporates many of cognitive psychology's
findings, and it has become common in the media to apply the term "behavioral economics" to the findings of several fields. See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Behavior and Energy Policy, 327 SCIENCE 1204, 1204-05
(2010); Grunwald, supra note 3, at 28. For widely read recent works in social
psychology, see NOAH J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., YES: 50 SCIENTIFICALLY PROVEN

WAYS TO BE PERSUASIVE (2008); DOUGLAS MCKENZIE-MOHR & WILLIAM
SMITH, FOSTERING SUSTAINABLE BEHAVIOR (1999).
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suggest that a multitude of factors beyond price explain the variability in human behavior, and understanding these factors
can make regulation more effective. 7 For simplicity, we refer in
this Article to behavioral economics and the related behavioral
and social sciences as "behavioral science," although we note
that the term as we refer to it includes a wide range of fields,
such as sociology and social psychology, that are more commonly referred to as social science.8
Behavioral insights are important at three critical stages
in the regulatory process. First, they can help to improve the
manner in which agencies develop regulatory options early on
in the regulatory process. 9 A quick illustration is helpful. Although electric cars have the potential to reduce carbon- and
other air-emissions, recent studies suggest that their impact
and cost may vary dramatically based on whether drivers recharge their vehicles at peak or off-peak periods (e.g., when
they arrive home from work, or in the middle of the night).10
7.

See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 153-59 (1992) (arguing that information about
risk increases regulations' effectiveness); John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert
Wiener, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK 226, 241-68 (John D.
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (describing regulatory efforts
that take into account human behavior); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1077-88 (2000) (noting that
one role of cost-benefit analysis is to correct for decisionmaking by policymakers under pressure from non-rational public responses to risk).
8. We include a number of fields in the term "behavioral science." See,
e.g., GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS (2000) (economic sociology); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 6 (social psychology); Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 2 (cognitive psychology); George Loewenstein et
al., Neuroeconomics, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 647 (2008) (neuroeconomics).
9. Section 6(a)(3)(C)(iii) of Executive Order 12,866 directs agencies to
analyze "potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives to the
planned regulation." Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C)(iii), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645
(1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006); see also Jonathan Baert Wiener,
Mechanism Choice, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber &
Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 30-31), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1408163 (discussing
the potential influence of behavioral insights on regulatory-instrument choice);
2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 3, 9 (identifying principles to
assist agencies' use of information disclosure, simplification, and default rules).
10. See discussion infra Part I.A. We use the term "electric cars" to refer
to all personal light-duty vehicles that draw some or all of their energy from
the electric grid, including plug-in hybrids as well as standard electric cars.
The Department of Energy has included deployment of 500,000 plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles per year by 2015 in its seven "high priority performance
goals." OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 79 (2010) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES],
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Even though Congress has not passed a statute narrowing the
options, the discussion of options already has begun to focus on
approaches that reflect the traditional assumption that individuals respond in predictably rational ways to monetary incentives and technological fixes." If an agency focuses only on
approaches for recharging electric cars based on the price of
electricity or the development of new equipment, however, it
may miss opportunities for greater emissions reductions at
lower cost. For example, increasing electricity rates during
peak periods may discourage peak-period recharging, but the
magnitude of the price increase necessary to induce the desired
level of off-peak recharging may generate consumer and political backlash. 12 By accounting for a more complete range of responses (e.g., the importance of cognitive costs, habits, and
hyperbolic discounting), and by combining pricing strategies
with behaviorally sensitive solutions (e.g., immediate feedback
and normative messaging), an agency may be able to develop
alternative or complementary regulatory strategies that are
more effective, efficient, and politically viable. Pairing priceand technology-based approaches with behavioral approaches
also may produce synergistic gains.13 Billions of dollars-and
millions of tons of carbon emissions-may be at stake.
Second, behavioral science insights can add value when
agencies subject their regulatory options to cost-benefit analysis and when these cost-benefit analyses are subject to OIRA

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/AnalyticalPerspectives
(click on "Performance & Management" hyperlink).
11. See discussion infra Part III.A; see also Thomas Webler & Seth P. Tuler, Getting the Engineering Right Is Not Always Enough: Researching the
Human Dimensions of the New Energy Technologies, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 2690,
2691 (2010).
12. AHMAD FARUQUI & LISA WOOD, QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS OF
DYNAMIC PRICING IN THE MASS MARKET 30 (2008), available at http://www.eei

.org/ourissues/electricitydistribution/Documents/quantifying benefits final.pdf
(noting that the level of off-peak to on-peak price shift needed to induce a reduction in peak load demand is often higher than utilities are willing to implement due to the fear of negative customer response).
13. Some evidence for this effect can be found in programs that have
paired economic disincentives, such as taxes or fines, with public education
campaigns that highlight the moral case for adoption of the target behavior.
For example, a tax on plastic grocery bags in Ireland paired with an aggressive media campaign led to a ninety-four percent drop in the use of plastic
bags. Elisabeth Rosenthal, With Irish Tax, Plastic Bags Go the Way of the
Snakes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A3, available at 2008 WL 1990925.
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review.14 Cost-benefit analysis, which relies heavily on neoclassical economics, was originally intended to reduce regulatory
burdens by eliminating regulation with costs in excess of benefits.15 But such analysis has attracted support from those who
have found in it the potential not to eliminate regulation but to
improve regulation, by making regulation work better for affected parties. 16 On this account, cost-benefit analysis focuses
agency officials on accepted economic criteria for regulation,
enabling regulators to resist their own narrow preferences or
pressures from an irrational public. As Cass Sunstein has argued, one role of cost-benefit analysis-whether narrowly or
broadly construed-is to provide the data necessary to serve as
a counterweight to irrational perceptions of and responses to
risk.17 But many have realized that cost-benefit analysis, whatever its theoretical advantages, cannot deliver in practice if it
fails to correct for extra-rational responses to regulation. Behavioral insights are useful in this regard.
Third, to the extent that behavioral remedies reduce the
economic or political cost of a regulatory measure or increase
its effectiveness, behavioral insights can affect not only the
specific regulatory measure selected, but also the social goal
that a regulatory action is designed to achieve. Lower regulatory costs and greater effectiveness may allow regulators to
achieve a more ambitious goal or may save resources for other
social investments. In short, behavioral insights may not only
affect development and review of particular regulations, but also the selection and achievement of broader social goals.
Although agencies and OIRA have come to recognize the
potential of behavioral economics to respond to predictable deviations from traditional rationality assumptions, 18 they lack a

14. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(C)(iii), 3 C.F.R. at 646 (requiring that
agencies "assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation").
15. NICK HANLEY & CLIVE L. SPASH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS & THE
ENVIRONMENT 4-6 (1993).
16. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1096.
17. See id. at 1077-88; see also ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 10,
at 98 ("By drawing attention to the consequences of proposed courses of action,
benefit-cost analysis can help the public to evaluate regulatory initiatives.").
18. See, e.g., SOC'Y FOR RISK ANALYSIS, COMMITTEE OF PAST PRESIDENTS'
RECOMMENDATIONS TO OMB ON REGULATORY REVIEW 5 (2009), available at
http://reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/OIRAEO_12866_revisionSRA
comments.pdf (recommending that OIRA "[e]nhance the role of social and behavioral sciences, regarding how and why people (as individuals or groups)
behave and decide in response to risks, opportunities, and uncertainty"); 2010
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framework for incorporating these insights into regulatory
analysis with anywhere near the rigor of traditional rationalactor-based considerations. Behavioral research demonstrates
the extent and limits of rational action, but it does not tell us
how to consider what appear to be extra-rational tendencies
(e.g., reliance on heuristics, framing effects, or motivational
crowding) in regulatory analysis. 19 Nor have legal scholars articulated a framework for incorporating behavioral insights into the regulatory process, despite excellent theoretical work in
the area. 20
The purpose of this Article is to take an initial step toward
developing such a framework. A framework will better enable
agencies to apply behavioral analysis in a systematic and concrete fashion. 2 1 In this way, it will better enable agencies to apply behavioral analysis in a manner sufficient to achieve its intended results-that is, to prevent agencies from making
irrational decisions, either because of their own misperceptions
OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 3-12 (providing guidance to agencies
on use of behavioral principles in the regulatory process).
19. There is an ongoing debate as to whether the empirical observations
reviewed here represent actual departures from rationality or are simply the
result of other factors that are consistent with a rational, utility-maximizing
agent. See BOUNDED RATIONALITY 10 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten
eds., 2001); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (1998). In this Article, we contrast empirical findings from social and behavioral findings with the "thick' conceptions of rationality that have dominated, implicitly if not explicitly, much of
the study of law and economics. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law
and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1066, 1070-73 (2000). We do not intend to engage in the debate over the definition of rationality. Instead, we
hope to offer a framework for incorporating a greater degree of behavioral
realism (regardless of how labeled) into the process of regulatory development,
review, and selection. For ease of discussion, we refer to this set of behavioral
tendencies as "extra-rational behavior."
20. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Bounded Rationality and Legal Scholarship, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 137, 137 (Mark

D. White ed., 2010) (identifying the need for legal scholars to account for
bounded rationality in the development of legal prescriptions); Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After Behavioral Economics, 55 U.
KAN. L. REV. 629, 660-67 (2007) (proposing a behavioral framework that emphasizes the context of human action as an independent factor in the regulatory process); Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1476 (providing a framework for the
use of behavioral economics research in law).
21. For a more general framework, see Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 150845. For the classic example of the development and application of a rigorous
framework for legal analysis, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-111 (1972).
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or unanticipated responses from the public. In addition, such a
framework will enable agencies to generate data about behavioral effects and will reveal areas for further research. Behavioral analysis is likely to develop incrementally. A framework
will accelerate the pace of learning.
Without a framework like that in question, agencies may
not only miss an opportunity to use behavioral analysis to improve the efficacy and efficiency of regulation, but they may use
behavioral analysis in a way that actually decreases the effectiveness of regulation. Important insights may simply be overlooked in the thicket of published studies. As with traditional
price-based mechanisms, behavioral measures may, at times,
lead to counterproductive results, particularly when not implemented properly. 22 Or behavioral analysis may be used selectively to support desired outcomes and ignored when contrary to desired outcomes. 23 At the same time, it may be used
without the necessary transparency to facilitate judicial review
of regulation, 24 or to promote congressional oversight. 25 In this
sense, it may decrease the accountability of regulation. 26 At a
22. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Lulling Effect: The Impact of ChildResistant Packagingon Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
324, 326-27 (1984) (documenting that the proportion of accidental aspirin ingestions from safety-capped bottles rose sharply after the introduction of childresistant bottle caps); W. Kip Viscusi & Gerald Cavallo, Safety Behavior and
Consumer Responses to CigaretteLighter Safety Mechanisms, 17 MANAGERIAL
& DECISION ECON. 441, 456 (1996) (suggesting that regulators consider consumer responses to product safety improvements and consider pairing technological approaches with hazard warnings and consumer education).
23. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the
Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control,
105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 94-95 (2006) (noting that the selective presidential control of agency regulation, as exercised in part through OIRA, can undermine
the legitimacy of such regulation). A related danger is that ad hoc review will
enable agencies to overvalue one consideration at the expense of others. Many
have argued that OIRA overemphasizes consideration of costs at the expense
of benefits, which can tilt regulation in an antiregulatory direction. See, e.g.,
Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1262-63 (2006) (arguing that uneven application of cost-benefit analysis by OIRA can lead to a deregulatory bias).
24. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2331-39 (2001) (noting the importance of transparency in the OMB and
of greater White House control of agency regulation).
25. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 254-58 (1987) (arguing that congressional monitoring of agency regulation depends in part on
constituent access to information about such regulation).

26. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative
Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1805-07 (2007) (arguing that congressional
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minimum, a framework will help on these fronts by promoting
the regularity and transparency of behavioral analysis as well
as the rationality and accountability of regulation.
The framework that we present can be described succinctly
as follows. 2 7 An agency will ask whether the targeted behavior
occurs in any of the situations under which individuals are likely to depart from traditional rationality assumptions. When developing new rules or policies, agencies will account for these
extra-rational responses. When justifying a regulation under
cost-benefit analysis, an agency will include behavioral considerations alongside more traditional ones. Accounting for behavioral insights may induce the agency to adopt a different regulatory option or different mix of options. For example, an
energy regulation that involves electric cars may have fewer
costs and greater benefits if coupled with a plan that includes
behavioral measures to induce drivers to recharge at optimal
hours; and it might have fewer costs and greater benefits than
entirely different alternatives directed at the transportation
sector.
Our framework also includes an important assumption
about behavior that is easily overlooked in the regulatory
process-that people are concerned with social outcomes in addition to monetary outcomes (i.e., wealth). For example, as discussed in more detail below, people seek social status within
valued social groups and social inclusion (e.g., descriptive
norms), and they seek to avoid social sanctions (e.g., injunctive
norms). Furthermore, as with monetary outcomes, they seek
social outcomes in both rational and extra-rational ways. As in
other social and behavioral sciences, a number of economists
have explored the role of preferences for social outcomes in economic models. 28 The framework we articulate is an attempt to
oversight, particularly when coupled with White House regulatory review, can
improve the accountability of agency regulation).
27. In developing our framework, we build on earlier work that examined
the implications of behavioral economics for cost-benefit analysis. See Adler,
supra note 20, at 155-62; Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1481-85; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1060-61; Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1
HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 303, 315-16 (2007).

28. For instance, the desires for fairness, altruistic tendencies, and morality have been extensively researched within economics. See, e.g., Kjell Arne
Brekke et al., An EconomicModel of Moral Motivation, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1967,
1968 (2003) (examining the role of moral self-image in influencing prosocial
behavior); Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Altruism in Anonymous
DictatorGames, 16 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 181, 188 (1996) (examining altruism
as a motivating factor in behavior); Matthew Rabin, IncorporatingFairness
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incorporate recent theoretical and empirical advancements regarding bounded rationality into a simple framework to be used
in the regulatory process. 29
To implement these insights, our framework does not jettison the classical economic track that focuses largely on the role
of monetary outcomes in an individual's utility function. However, we conceptualize this track as containing two prongs, one
that assumes rational action and one that takes account of predictable extra-rational action. We also introduce a parallel
track that assumes individuals are concerned with social outcomes. Although social outcomes in theory can be incorporated
into traditional approaches to utility maximization, too often
social outcomes are not fully accounted for in the regulatory
development, review, and selection process. 30 As with monetary
outcomes, we assume that individuals consider social outcomes
in both rational and extra-rational ways. Under the rational actor prong of the social outcomes track, we examine the effects of
social influences (e.g., descriptive norms and status) on decisionmaking. As with monetary outcomes, understanding the effects of inadequate information is an important part of the
analysis. After evaluating rational responses to social signals,
an agency would move to the second prong. Substantively, this
prong includes behavioral tendencies that deviate from expectations based on a socially rational actor. In some cases these
tendencies mirror the behavioral quirks discussed in the behavioral economics literature, such as framing effects. In other
cases, these deviations are specific to social outcomes, such as
commitment effects or the development of personal norms.
When we organize the analytical framework in this way, it
becomes apparent that accounting for extra-rational responses
to social outcomes is an essential, but largely underappreciated, area of regulatory analysis. If cost-benefit analysis can
account for rational and extra-rational action regarding monetary outcomes, it also can account for rational and extrainto Game Theory and Economics, 83 Am. ECON. REV. 1281, 1282 (1993) (presenting a framework to study implications of fairness in economic situations).

29. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice:
Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 697-720 (using the
term "bounded rationality" as the notion that human decisionmaking is
bounded by cognitive and informational constraints).
30. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 68-73 (2006); Adler, supra note 20, at 160 (noting
that cost-benefit analysis is "the traditional technique for implementing
wealth-maximization and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency").
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rational action regarding social outcomes. 3 1 Legal scholars have
hinted at the issue, noting that some behavior responds to social signals rather than pricing signals-for example, placing
an emoticon (sad face) on a high electric bill has the potential to
reduce future energy usage. 32 But scholars have not fully integrated this intuition into an analytical framework. Furthermore, they have not explored how individuals sometimes react
to social signals in a manner that appears to conflict with what
is socially optimal to that individual, just as individuals react
to pricing signals in ways that produce suboptimal monetary
outcomes.
To make the second prong workable under both the monetary and social outcome assumptions, we add another refinement. Drawing on social psychology and sociology, we argue
that agencies should consider the multiple levels of influence on
decisionmaking, including individual-level factors (e.g., income
and cognition) and social and community-level factors (e.g., local infrastructure and peer groups). Although it is not possible
to incorporate variables at all levels and the analysis will not
yield a simple quantitative outcome, this addition to the
framework provides a means for mapping the points of influence on behavior and identifying convergent or competing influences. Agencies that recognize opportunities for synergistic
policy mechanisms (such as normative messaging to reinforce a
price signal) can take advantage of these opportunities. Similarly, variables that may cause a policy to be ineffective (e.g.,
infrastructure limitations) can be considered in regulatory design.
After we sketch our framework, we apply it to two concrete
examples: policies to encourage electric cars, as mentioned
above, and policies to encourage investments in energy efficient
appliances. 33 We show that accounting for behavioral insights
31. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1119-20 (identifying a
matrix including property rules and liability rules with entitlements assigned
to polluters or victims, and noting that the framework leads to the insight that
a liability-rule-protected entitlement might be assigned to a polluter as well as
a victim). The importance of analyzing non-rational responses to social outcome maximization emerges from our framework in a similar way. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.
32. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 68-69.
33. Individual and household behavioral changes could reduce U.S. carbon
emissions by seven percent in ten years. See Thomas Dietz, Gerald T. Gardner, Jonathan Gilligan, Paul C. Stern & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Household
Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce U.S. Carbon
Emissions, 106 PROC. NATL ACAD. Sol. 18,452, at 18,452 (2009).
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may require agency officials to suspend intuition regarding the
most effective ways to influence behavior and to frame information. We also show that agency officials may need to develop
more comprehensive and creative policy measures. Using these
examples, we show that the payoffs for well-designed programs
can be substantial.
We do not resolve all uncertainties in the application of our
framework. The behavioral research of the last several decades
has not provided all of the information that agency officials
need to consider preferences regarding social outcomes comprehensively. We expect that behavioral analysis will develop
incrementally and cautiously, just as cost-benefit analysis did
in its early years when it focused only on cost effectiveness and
was only able to draw on limited or experimental data to support various aspects of the analysis.34 Thus, we expect that
agencies will conduct behavioral analysis in some cases with
less data than what has come to be expected for modern costbenefit analysis. But that will change over time, and will do so
sooner as a result of the systematic application of the type of
analysis that our framework facilitates. As we note above, our
framework also identifies promising new areas for behavioral
research. Such research could provide the data that would allow agency officials to design policies that reflect behavioral insights, and would facilitate more rigorous evaluation of the
costs and benefits of such policies. 35 In particular, it may be
necessary to develop new lines of research within social psychology and sociology to examine extra-rational patterns of behavior in pursuit of social outcomes. It also may be necessary
for agencies and OIRA to add social psychologists, sociologists,
and other behavioral experts to their regulatory teams.36
If agencies identify early wins using behavioral and social
science insights, the current momentum will continue. Similarly, if OIRA continues to signal that it values and takes the im34. In the Carter Administration, economic analysis of regulations was
conducted to determine only the cost effectiveness of regulatory actions. See
Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
FederalRegulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1489, 1505-06 (2002). Benefits analysis was added in the Reagan Administration. Id.; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 854 (2000).
35. For a discussion of regulatory instrument choice, see Jonathan Baert
Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 679-80, 704-35 (1999).
36. The recent OIRA memorandum on the use of behavioral approaches
notes the importance of consulting with behavioral scientists and of conducting
rigorous empirical studies. See 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 5.

2011]

REGULATION IN THE BEHAVIORAL ERA

727

plications seriously, then agencies are more likely to follow
suit.37 We also can imagine that certain administrative law requirements might help prompt agency officials to consider seriously the findings of behavioral analysis. If behavioral analysis is necessary to a rational decision, then courts can ensure
that agencies consider it under the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. 38 And if agencies
rely on behavioral analysis in making a decision, then courts
can review the adequacy of the analysis. 39 It is not our goal to
address these issues until we see the effects of a more systematic application of behavioral analysis. 40
Finally, we do not attempt to wade into the debate about
the precise form of cost-benefit analysis that agencies or OIRA
should perform, 4 1 or whether entirely different alternatives are
preferable. 42 Whether conducted as a part of traditional costbenefit analysis, as a parallel process that yields results that
accompany the results of the cost-benefit analysis, or as a part
of some alternative process, we believe that a structured, rigorous approach to behavioral insights will enhance the likelihood
that agencies will make effective, rational, and accountable decisions.
37. Id.
38. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2007); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983) (interpreting the "arbitrary and
capricious standard" of the Administrative Procedure Act to require that agencies demonstrate that they have considered all relevant factors and all important aspects of a problem).
39. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (requiring the Agency to reveal the actual basis on which it relied and declining to uphold the
agency's decision on any other basis).
40. Likewise, we do not and cannot address whether behavioral or traditional economic analysis should prevail in cases of conflict. Our framework
does not purport to provide a fully integrated model; indeed, pursuit of such a
model is akin to pursuit of the Holy Grail. These sorts of issues are not exclusive to behavioral analysis. In some sense, they are present in the classic conflict
between agency expertise and political accountability in administrative law.
See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics
to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2008) (using the Supreme Court's decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), to discuss the tension between
administrative expertise and political accountability). When technocratic
judgment and political responsiveness point in different directions, agencies
are forced to make a choice (and sometimes courts may have a say as well).
41. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 30, at 68-100.
42. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355, 1379-96 (2009) (arguing that the European regulatory model is a superior alternative to cost-benefit analysis for regulating
toxic chemicals).
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This Article proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, we discuss
the role of models for predicting behavior in regulatory development and review, and the limits of the price mechanism that
often is the selected regulatory instrument for problems analyzed using the dominant rational-actor model. Part II suggests
an analytical framework to ensure that behavioral insights fulfill their promise of improving the efficacy of regulation while
simultaneously promoting the rationality and accountability of
regulation. To illustrate the framework, Part III then applies it
to regulatory actions aimed at improving energy efficiency and
reducing carbon emissions. This Article concludes that the proposed analytical framework is an important first step in the
process of incorporating behavioral insights into regulatory development and review and ultimately the selection of regulatory objectives.
I. MODELS FOR PREDICTING BEHAVIOR: THEORETICAL
BACKGROUND
In this Part, we describe the regulatory environment in
which behavioral economics and social science research has
emerged. Specifically, we discuss the role of models for predicting behavior in regulatory development, review, and selection.
We show that a rational-actor model leads to a heavy reliance
on the price mechanism, which seeks to change behavior by increasing the monetary cost of undesired behaviors and decreasing the cost of desired behaviors. Furthermore, we examine the
limits of the price mechanism for predicting behavior and show
that consideration of complementary or alternative regulatory
instruments will often lead to more effective, efficient, and politically viable regulation.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF MODELS FOR PREDICTING BEHAVIOR

Agencies use implicit or explicit models when evaluating
the anticipated response of regulated entities, whether individuals or firms, to various regulatory instruments. 4 3 The model
that an agency selects affects its regulatory initiative from inception through OMB regulatory review to agency regulatory
adoption and judicial review. 44 Whether an agency chooses to
43. Cf. Kahneman, supra note 29, at 705-06 (discussing how assumptions
about and models of human behavior frame decisions that aim to maximize
utility).
44. Cf. Gregory Scott Crespi, The FatalFlaw of Cost-Benefit Analysis: The
Problem of Person-Altering Consequences, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,703, at 10,703
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adopt a regulatory directive (e.g., a traditional command-andcontrol regulation), an economic incentive (e.g., tax, subsidy, or
cap-and-trade scheme), a liability scheme, an informational
disclosure requirement, or other measure, it must consider the
expected response of the regulated community. In fact, this
consideration affects all aspects of the policy choice, including
the level of resources the agency devotes to the effort, which
regulatory tool (if any) it ultimately selects from the alternatives, and the outcome the regulatory tool is expected to
achieve.
Yet agencies face barriers in evaluating the effects of regulation on the regulated community. Among the leading barriers
is the inability of simple models to predict responses to interventions by the regulated community, such as efforts designed
to reduce energy use and carbon emissions. 45 For example,
price is an important factor, but household energy strategies
that rely on assumptions of rational responses to price signals
(e.g., increasing the price of electricity to induce efficiency and
conservation) or price signals combined with new technologies
often yield disappointing results. 46 In the absence of an accessi-

n.1 (2008) ("Prospective cost-benefit analyses of rulemaking initiatives and
subsequent OIRA review (and, upon occasion, also judicial review) now appear
to be entrenched as a significant feature of the federal regulatory process." (citation omitted)).
45. See Paul C. Stern, Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant Behavior, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 407, 419-20 (2000); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How PersonalNorms Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1103-06 (2005); Charlie Wilson & Hadi
Dowlatabadi, Models of Decision Making and Residential Energy Use, 32 ANN.
REV. ENVT & RESOURCES 169, 189 (2007). Our focus here is on individuals
and households, although many of the behavioral insights are relevant to the
behavior of small businesses, large corporations, and nonprofit organizations
as well. Of course, behavioral analysis could just provide policymakers with a
means to "avoid painful but more effective solutions rooted in traditional economics," such as removing subsidies or introducing taxes. George Loewenstein
& Peter Ubel, Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A31,
available at 2010 WLNR 14148206; see also Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and
Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and
Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72 (2002) (positing that a
middle ground between perfect rationality and equal incompetence illuminates
ways the legal system may foster rational or counter-irrational behavior). We
note that behavioral measures need not displace traditional regulatory measures, however. In many cases, behavioral measures may supplement traditional
measures or may fill gaps when public support is lacking for such measures.
46. See, e.g., Paul C. Stern, Blind Spots in Policy Analysis: What Economics Doesn't Say About Energy Use, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 200, 2 10-11
(1986) (noting that when the monetary value of price incentives for energy ef-

730

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:715

ble account that reflects the complex influences on behavior,
regulators all too often appear to rely solely on the price mechanism or to fall back on common intuitions. The magnitude of
the price increase necessary to achieve the desired behavior
change solely from financial incentives, however, often undermines the political viability of the price mechanism. 47 In addition, approaches that do not account for behavioral insights
may discourage the development of more viable policy options
and can even lead to counterproductive results. 48
B. THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF RATIONAL ACTION

Rational choice theory (RCT) underlies the dominant model for analysis of regulatory policy alternatives, including those
that affect individuals and households. Although there are multiple interpretations of RCT, 49 a common assumption is that
individuals are rational actors whose decisions are driven by
the desire to maximize utility given resource constraints.5 0
RCT, at its core, assumes that individuals hold stable preferences and seek out the necessary information regarding their
set of options prior to making a decision. Ultimately, decisions
are made on the basis of a deliberate analysis of the expected
payoffs of a set of options, considering both their desirability
and their probability of occurring. A choice is considered raficiency investments are held constant, participation rates can vary by a factor
often due to non-price-related factors).
47. See, e.g., W. Ross Morrow et al., Analysis of Policies to Reduce Oil Consumption and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions from the U.S. Transportation Sector,
38 ENERGY POL'Y 1305, 1317-18 (2010) (concluding that a price of gasoline between $5.00 and $7.00 per gallon would be necessary to achieve a fourteen
percent U.S. reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 2005 levels by 2025).
48. See, e.g., Robert B. Cialdini, Crafting Normative Messages to Protect
the Environment, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 105, 108-09 (2003)
(noting that public education campaigns that communicate that an undesirable behavior is "regrettably frequent" can lead to an increase in the undesirable behavior by sending the descriptively normative message that the behavior
is common and therefore acceptable); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in CorporateEnvironmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 104-05, 115 (2003) (discussing studies on
the unintended effects of regulatory interventions on tax compliance); Viscusi,
supra note 22, at 326-27 (discussing unintended consequences of childresistant bottle caps).
49. For a discussion of the interpretations of the rational-actor model, see
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1070-74.
50. For a discussion of the assumptions and variations of rational choice
theory, see Andrew M. Colman, Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and
Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction, 26 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 139,
139-43 (2003), and Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1060-66.
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tional if there is no alternative that provides a more optimal
outcome to the individual. 51
The specific criteria by which the utility of an outcome is
measured have been heavily disputed by those within the behavioral sciences. In the narrowest application of RCT, individual utility is measured largely in terms of monetary selfinterest. 52 As such, nonmonetary benefits such as social inclusion or an environment free of litter are generally assumed to
be excluded from the cost-benefit calculations of rational individuals.5 3 Given the wealth of behavioral data to suggest a
broader set of motivations are in play, many economists no
longer subscribe to this limited interpretation of self-interest. 54
However, this approach remains prominent within law and
economics at least implicitly, as seen in the types of policy
mechanisms that are often advocated.5 5 A number of potential
reasons may explain the continued persistence of this approach. First, a rigid view of individual utility does allow for a
clearly defined baseline from which to develop behavioral predictions, which the more expanded interpretations of rationality do not provide. Although a substantial degree of variance
may exist in how individuals respond to price mechanisms, the
thick version of RCT allows for clear predictions about those
responses in the aggregate.5 6 An expanded definition of utility
may require agencies to spend substantial time and money on
research into the effectiveness of regulatory alternatives. Simi51. For a more detailed discussion of rational choice theory, see GARY S.
BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3-14 (1976); Col-

man, supranote 50, at 139-43; and Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1060-66.
52. See Adler, supra note 20, at 158-59; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19,
at 1064-65; see also Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231,
1237-38 & n.12 (2001) (noting that measuring utility entirely based on monetary incentives is often described as a "thick" approach to utility).
53. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1065.
54. See, e.g., Loewenstein et al., supra note 8, at 661 (noting that the position that individuals act only according to pure self-interest is a minority position within economics); Posner, supra note 19, at 1551-52 (explaining his
broadly defined interpretation of rational action as well as the point that the
economic analysis of law has "long ago abandoned the model of hyper rational,
emotionless, unsocial, supremely egoistic, nonstrategic man (or woman)").
55. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1622 n.39 (2000); see also Loewenstein &
Ubel, supra note 45, at A31.
56. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1057 n.18 (positing that aggregate behavior follows predictions of rational choice theory even where individuals deviate from that behavior, so long as those deviations are symmetrically distributed).
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larly, regulations that anticipate individual variation in responses to law and policy may require a substantial degree of
segmentation and tailoring to regulatory targets. Again, although potentially more effective, the broader approach sacrifices scalability and therefore may not be feasible in some circumstances.
In the broadest applications of RCT, individuals are conceived of as rational in the sense that they act deliberately to
maximize their own interests; yet the individual's interests are
subjectively defined.5 7 Thus, an individual could act to maximize objectively defined monetary outcomes or subjectively defined social outcomes. However, in both cases one should expect
that the individual will act in a manner that is consistent with
his or her own goals. It is this version of RCT that has been
most often applied by psychologists and those in the social
sciences, as well as a growing number of economists, because it
accommodates both monetary and social drivers of behavior
such as group membership and social norms.58 The emphasis
on subjective, rather than objective, well-being is largely due to
a growing field of research that has revealed a host of nonmonetary motivators that influence decisionmaking, sometimes
to the point of overwhelming the role of financial self-interest.
For example, a preference for the status quo leads many to
maintain retirement plans that are economically suboptimal
and unnecessarily risky. 59 Similarly, social dilemma experiments have shown that despite predictions based on a rationalactor model, individuals display a remarkable willingness to
cooperate in some situations.6 0 This is particularly true when
57. See Carlson, supra note 52, at 1237-38 (noting that this is often described as a "thin" approach to utility). For a discussion of thin conceptions of
utility, see Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1479 (discussing "bounded selfinterest"), and Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1061-62.
58. See Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169,
175-78 (1980) (discussing an expanded definition of utility that includes nonmonetary outcomes); Posner, supra note 19, at 1551-52.
59. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 31-33 (1988).
60. In a meta-analysis of over one hundred social dilemma experiments,
David Sally found an average cooperation rate of forty-seven percent within
one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games, although cooperation varied widely depending on the situational variables manipulated in the studies. David Sally,
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments From 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 58, 60-62 (1995). In their
review of this literature, Robyn Dawes and Richard Thaler state that cooperation rates in one-shot social dilemmas typically range between forty and sixty
percent, even though rational choice theory (where utility is measured by
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the individual feels a sense of social connectedness or reciprocity with the other individuals involved in the dilemma. 6 1 Other
work finds that individuals will go to great lengths to conform
to the attitudes and beliefs of those around them, even when
conforming violates known facts or one's own ideological
worldview. 62
In addition to questions about the definition of selfinterest, additional work within the behavioral sciences has
questioned whether we can assume that individuals actually
make calculated considerations of costs and benefits, even
when self-interest is expanded to include noneconomic drivers
of behavior. For example, empirical studies have challenged the
view that individuals truly hold a set of stable preferences, as is
presumed by RCT. Psychologists and behavioral economists
have found that preferences are highly contingent on factors
such as how choices are framed and the temporal distance between costs and benefits. 63 The seminal work of Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky revealed that humans rely heavily on decisional heuristics that reduce cognitive effort, but

monetary self-interest) would predict a zero percent cooperation rate. Robyn
M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP.
187, 188-89 (1988).
61. See Robyn M. Dawes & David M. Messick, Social Dilemmas, 35 INT'L
J. PSYCHOL. 111, 114 (2000) (noting that social identification with others involved in social dilemmas leads to greater levels of cooperation); Peter Kollock,
Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. REV. SoC. 183, 195-97
(1998) (reviewing literature on the influence of reciprocity norms on decisionmaking in social dilemmas).
62. For example, Solomon Asch demonstrated that roughly one-third of
individuals will give an obviously incorrect answer to a simple line judgment
task when that answer is given by the others in the room. Solomon E. Asch,
Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments,
in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN 177, 177-81, 186 (Howard Guetzkow ed.,
1951). Geoffrey Cohen has found that support of a welfare policy among liberals and conservatives depends more on whether the policy is endorsed by a
Republican or Democrat than on the actual content of the policy. Geoffrey L.
Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 819 (2003).
63. See Stephen J. Hoch & George F. Loewenstein, Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self-Control, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 492, 497 (1991) (discussing the impact of temporal proximity on consumer preferences); Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 2, at 143-44 (discussing how the framing of
possible outcomes may change individual preferences); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211
SCIENCE 453, 453-58 (1985) (discussing how the framing of prospects, contingencies, and outcomes can lead to preference reversals).
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these decision rules often lead to suboptimal outcomes. 64 Even
when the motivation is to conform to a social norm, individuals
do not always appear to make a deliberate or calculated decision about many behaviors.6 5
Despite its shortcomings, RCT continues to be a dominant
model in legal and policy frameworks.6 6 As mentioned, it provides a clear starting place from which to make behavioral predictions. Meanwhile, psychological and sociological theories
that offer a more nuanced understanding of human behavior
are often applied on an ad hoc basis.6 7 Predictions and tests of
those predictions are often specific to a single outcome variable,
or subset of behaviors. 68 Although this approach may allow for
a more detailed understanding of the variables that influence
specific behaviors within certain populations, it fails to offer a
simple and comprehensive model that can be applied across
multiple contexts and groups. 69 Furthermore, without the pressure that has existed within law and economics to develop a
single, overarching framework and broadly applicable laws and
policies, 70 psychology and sociology have suffered from theory
inflation. The litany of models and variables that have been revealed to influence behavior has seemed to spiral out of control
64. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:

Heuristics and

Biases,

in

JUDGMENT

UNDER

UNCERTAINTY:

HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3-20 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (reviewing several judgmental heuristics and the cognitive biases they tend to produce). For a review of cognitive heuristics in decisionmaking, see Daniel
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003).
65. Jessica Nolan and her coauthors found that while individuals believed
that the behavior of their neighbors had little impact on their own energy-use
behaviors, the data showed that descriptive norms were the strongest predictor of actual behavior. Jessica M. Nolan et al., Normative Social Influence Is
Underdetected, 34 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 913, 920-21 (2008).
66. See Wilson & Dowlatabadi, supra note 45, at 172 (analyzing rational
choice as a building block of economic theory).
67. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 2, at 12 (listing multiple theories of economically relevant psychology that he does not apply to his analysis).
68. See Bernice A. Pescosolido, Beyond Rational Choice: The Social Dynamics of How People Seek Help, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1096, 1102 (1992) (describing
how certain actions or choices are targeted for testing, while others are ignored).
69. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax
Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1788-89 (2000) (concluding that the effects
of personal norms are not valuable for explaining tax behavior); Scott, supra
note 55, at 1622 n.39 (explaining that personal norms are not consistent with
environmental behavior).
70. See, e.g., Wilson & Dowlatabadi, supra note 45, at 172 (describing rational choice theory as background to economics and policy decisions).
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in some cases.7 1 Identical or nearly identical theories or constructs are often referred to under different names across subdisciplines (and even sometimes within a subdiscipline). 72 This
has created a sense of confusion among those who are not
trained within these disciplines and has led many to embrace
the more simplified rational-choice model for its parsimony, if
not its precision. 73
The continued reliance on RCT has had several effects on
regulatory decisionmaking. Foremost, it has fostered continued
reliance on price mechanisms as regulatory instruments. 74
Whether through regulation, Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, or
Coasian cap-and-trade measures, regulators often seek to
change behavior by increasing the monetary cost of undesirable
behavior or lowering the price of desirable behavior.75 Although
it is clear that prices affect behavior, the degree of variance in
response to price-based mechanisms is often overlooked. For
example, energy efficiency policies and programs around the
country have predominantly operated under the theory that
cost-effective technologies and practices will sell themselves.7 6
Rational-actor models assume that if cost structures are favorable to the consumer, individuals will behave rationally.7 7 Yet,
decades of research suggest that, despite a preponderance of
cost-effective options, only a limited investment in these tech71. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 2, at 12 (listing a multitude of psychology
theories that researchers use to explain behavior).
72. This problem has been noted by multiple researchers within psychology and is sometimes referred to as the "jangle fallacy." See, e.g., Jack Block,
Three Tasks for PersonalityPsychology, in DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE AND THE
HOLISTIC APPROACH 155, 156-57 (Lars R. Bergman et al. eds., 2000); see also
Michael W. Katzko, The Rhetoric of PsychologicalResearch and the Problem of
Unification in Psychology, 57 AM. PSYCHOL. 262, 264-69 (2002).
73. See Stern, supra note 46, at 200-01 (explaining how policy analysts
use the simplified rational-actor theory).
74. See, e.g., Morrow et al., supra note 47, at 1307-08 (examining several
federal programs using financial incentives to influence individual behavior).
75.

See LOREN LUTZENHISER ET AL., CAL. INST. FOR ENERGY AND ENV'T,

BEHAVIOR AND ENERGY PROGRAM, BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING
CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL SECTOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS 20-24

(2009), available at http://uc-ciee.org/pubs/ref behavior.html; MICHAEL J.
SULLIVAN, CAL. INST. FOR ENERGY AND ENV'T, BEHAVIOR AND ENERGY
PROGRAM, BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING ENERGY EFFICIENCY

PROGRAMS FOR BUSINESSES 21-24 (2009), available at http://uc-ciee.org/pubs/
refbehavior.html (concluding that rational decision models lead to an overemphasis on information- and price-based approaches); Wiener, supra note 35,
at 704-35 (discussing economic theory and other instruments of regulation).
76. See Wilson & Dowlatabadi, supra note 45, at 172.
77.

Id.
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nologies has occurred (i.e., the "efficiency gap").7 8 Price clearly
matters, but research suggests that the role of price varies
widely depending on the situation. In some cases, price accounts for less variance in behavior than other factors, such as
a psychological commitment or social norms. 79 In other cases,
the effectiveness of price-based mechanisms can be bolstered
when paired with well-designed behavioral interventions.8 0
The success of price-based policies also depends heavily on
non-price-related features. Participation rates in a set of home
efficiency programs that offer identical financial incentive
packages vary by a factor of ten.81 Nonfinancial variables such
as program marketing and management explain much of this
variance. 82 Furthermore, nonfinancial factors become more important in determining program success as the incentive becomes more attractive to the consumer.83 In many cases, efficient and effective incentive programs thus require program
design, implementation, and marketing that build on social
scientific expertise in consumer decisionmaking. 84 This is true
even when the incentive package is highly favorable for the
consumers to make efficiency upgrades that would otherwise be
cost prohibitive.85
Individuals also can be induced to change their behavior in
many cases even when no economic incentives are present. Interventions such as feedback, peer education, and social marketing campaigns have successfully reduced energy use among
office employees, dormitory residents, and individuals living on
military bases. 86 In each of these cases, individuals were not fi78. See Marilyn A. Brown, Market Failures and Barriers as a Basis for
Clean Energy Policies, 29 ENERGY POL'Y 1197, 1198-99 (2001); Charles, supra
note 3, at 810-11.
79. See Thomas A. Heberlein & G. Keith Warriner, The Influence of Price
and Attitude on Shifting Residential Electricity Consumption From On- to OffPeak Periods, 4 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 107, 125 (1983); Nolan et al., supra note
65, at 921.
80. See Rosenthal, supra note 13, at A3.
81. See Stern, supra note 45, at 210-11.
82. See id.
83. See Wilson & Dowlatabadi, supra note 46, at 174 (explaining how individual preferences are not fixed).
84. Id. at 174-75 (discussing the importance of framing the decisions
available to consumers in intervention programs).
85. See generally id. at 175 (emphasizing how consumers are influenced
more by comfort and fulfilled desires than by energy efficiency when renovating their homes).
86. For a workplace example, see Amanda R. Carrico & Manuel Riemer,
Motivating Pro-Environmental Behavior in an Organizational Setting: The
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nancially responsible for their energy consumption.87 Other interventions, such as time-of-use information about usage and
costs, have reduced energy use even without changes in price.
For example, providing households with real-time feedback
about their electricity consumption has been associated with
reductions in home energy use within a range of five to fifteen
percent with no accompanying rate changes.8 8 Similar results
have been reported with real-time fuel economy feedback in
personal motor vehicles. 89
In addition to a narrow focus on price mechanisms, RCT
has also induced regulators to rely on technological solutions to
reduce behavioral impacts rather than strategies to modify behavior. Again, to draw on examples from the energy policy literature, raising efficiency standards for household appliances
and creating price-based incentives to induce households to
adopt new, more efficient appliances have been a major focus of
residential energy policy initiatives. 90 Technologies that lower
the energy intensity of behavior without sacrificing comfort or
performance provide a solution that fits easily within the parameters of RCT. So long as individuals respond rationally to
price incentives to acquire new equipment, have adequate information about the use of the equipment, and make rational
decisions based on that information, these policies should
achieve positive results. Each of these assumptions has serious
limitations when applied to households, however, and policies
that account for behavioral insights regarding technology uptake and use are in their infancy.9 1 Technologies designed to
Use of Feedback and Peer Education to Reduce Energy Use (2009) (unpublished abstract) (on file with author). For a dormitory example, see John E.
Petersen et al., Dormitory Residents Reduce Electricity Consumption When
Exposed to Real-Time Visual Feedback and Incentives, 8 INT'L. J.
SUSTAINABILITY HIGHER EDUC. 16, 29 (2007). For a military base example, see

Andrea H. McMakin et al., Motivating Residents to Conserve Energy Without
FinancialIncentives, 34 ENVTL. BEHAv. 848, 856 (2002).
87.

See McMakin et al., supra note 86, at 849; Petersen et al., supra note

86, at 18; Carrico & Riemer, supra note 86.
88. For a review, see Wokje Abrahamse et al., A Review of Intervention
Studies Aimed at Household Energy Conservation, 25 J. ENV'T PSYCH. 273,
278-79 (2005).

89. See, e.g., infra note 122 and accompanying text.
90. See Abhijit Banerjee & Barry D. Solomon, Eco-Labeling for Energy Efficiency and Sustainability:A Meta-Evaluation of US Programs, 31 ENERGY
POL'Y 109, 111-12 (2003) (describing the purpose of various energy conserva-

tion policies).
91. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY USE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION
184 (1984) (explaining how individual behavior associated with energy use is

738

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:715

conserve energy, such as programmable thermostats or appliances with integrated energy-saving settings, are effective
only to the extent to which the consumer adopts the new technologies and uses them correctly. 92 In addition, policies designed to encourage curtailment behavior, such as reducing
motor vehicle idling, lowering highway driving speeds, or setting back thermostats, have received substantially less attention.
Although policies to encourage investments in efficiency
and other technological improvements offer promising solutions, measures that focus exclusively on price and technology
often have limited success. For example, the occurrence of "take
back effects," in which a portion of the achievable savings from
efficiency improvements are "taken back" due to an increase in
the use of energy, 93 demonstrates the danger of neglecting the
behavioral dimension of energy consumption. In many cases,
efficiency gains achieved through improvements in architecture
or technology have been partially or completely overcome by a
population that is acquiring more goods and using them more
intensively. For example, technological improvements have increased the efficiency of refrigerators by around seventy-five
percent over the past few decades; 94 however, the number of
U.S. households that own two or more refrigerators has also increased by roughly the same margin. 95 Behavioral measures
can supplement price and technology in ways that are less like-

often not incorporated into policy analysis, but should be in new programs and
policies).
92. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 78, at 1198 (citing a study where the majority of consumers did not purchase the energy efficient appliances, but instead
purchased cheaper appliances that consumed more energy in the long run).
93. See, e.g., Mathias Binswanger, Technological Progress and Sustainable Development: What About the Rebound Effect?, 36 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 119,
130 (2001); Horace Herring, Energy Efficiency-A Critical View, 31 ENERGY
10, 12 (2006).
94. For a review, see Jack N. Barkenbus, Putting Energy Efficiency in a
Sustainability Context, 48 ENVIRONMENT 10, 12 (2006).
95. According to surveys conducted by the Energy Information Administration, thirteen percent of households surveyed in 1987 owned two or more
refrigerators compared to twenty-two percent of those surveyed in 2005. See
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RESIDENTIAL ENERGY
CONSUMPTION SURVEY, PRESENCE OF APPLIANCES (1987), available at http://

www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/rees/reespubuse87/87publicuse.html;

U.S.

DEP'T OF

ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RESIDENTIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION SURVEY,

KITCHEN APPLIANCES (2005), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/rees/
recspubuse05/pubuseO5.html.
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ly to induce consumers to simply redirect savings from efficiency to other energy-using activities.
In addition, the assumption that individuals only respond
to price signals and that new technologies are only valuable
when linked to monetary incentives may lead regulators to
abandon the field altogether if they lack the political support to
change the price of the targeted behavior. Policies that link new
technology uptake to price signals in some cases can generate
opposition to both. Perhaps the most striking recent example is
the initial decision by the Maryland Public Service Commission
to reject a utility proposal to install 1.36 million smart meters
in homes. 96 The utility linked the proposal directly to peak demand pricing, which drew political fire from consumer and retiree advocates. 97
Although the use of behavioral insights often will require
resisting common intuitions about behavior, when applied
properly, the payoff of policies that reflect a wider range of influences on behavior can be substantial. Behavioral research on
household responses to energy information suggests that a proposal to install smart meters that simply provide feedback to
household energy users might have yielded substantial use reductions-although less than when coupled with a price measure-and it might face far less political resistance.98 After consumers become more comfortable with the new smart meter
technology, the peak pricing measures may generate less political resistance. In addition to reducing political or consumer
backlash, incorporating behavioral insights into a wide range of
household energy programs can yield success rates as much as

96. See Peter Behr, Md.'s Veto of Advance Meter Deployment Stuns Smart
Grid Advocates, CLIMATEWIRE (June 23, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/public/
climatewire/2010/06/23/1.
97. See id. ("While some state utility commissions are willing to back
smart meter deployment, they are reluctant to approve new 'dynamic' electricity rate plans that allow prices to rise during the day when power demand
peaks."). The utility later modified the program and obtained regulatory approval. See Peter Behr, Md. Smart Meter Plan Advances with Consumer Benefits as a Measure, CLIMATEWIRE (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/cw/
(search "ClimateWire" for "Md. Smart Meter Plan Advances"; then follow
"Grid" hyperlink) ("The commission emphasized, 'the success of this initiative,
and the likelihood that customers will actually see the benefits this project
promises, depend centrally on the success of the company's customer education and communication effort."').
98. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 91, at 39-41 (demonstrating how feedback on energy use, without cost savings, may be insufficient
to get customers to change their energy usage).
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ten times greater than poorly designed ones. 99 For example,
well-designed community-based efforts in Hood River, Oregon
induced eighty-five percent of eligible households to participate
in a home retrofit program. 100 Likewise, energy trends in California reflect nearly four decades of state policy directed toward
efficiency standards and demand-side management programs,
and some of these programs have reflected behavioral insights.10 1 During this time, per capita electricity consumption
in California remained stable while the national average grew
by forty percent (i.e., the Rosenfeld Effect). 102 This was
achieved while California simultaneously outperformed the national average in per capita economic growth. 103 Although a
host of factors contributed to this trend (e.g., urbanization and
changes in fuel sources), conservative estimates suggest that at
least a quarter of the difference between per capita energy consumption in the United States and California can be attributed
to policy measures directed toward energy use and efficiency. 104
The proportion of the difference that is attributable to behavioral measures is not known, but the Rosenfeld Effect suggests
the potential gains that a state can achieve from well-designed
energy conservation and efficiency efforts.

99. Nearly identical incentive programs directed toward home efficiency
improvements within similar geographic areas have varied by a factor of ten.
For a review, see Stern, supra note 46, at 210-11. Differential success rates of
these programs have been primarily attributed to marketing and implementation of the program. Id.
100. Eric Hirst, The Hood River Conservation Project: A Unique Research
and DemonstrationEffort, 13 ENERGY & BUILDINGS 3, 8 (1989).
101. For a review of California's Flex Your Power campaign in response to
the energy crisis of 2001, see Sylvia L. Bender et al., Using Mass Media to Influence Energy Consumption Behavior: California's 2001 Flex Your Power
Campaign as a Case Study 8.15, 8.17 (2002), available at http://citeseerx.ist
.psu.edulviewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.156.8308&rep=repl&type=pdf (examining the campaign's formulation, implementation, and strategic evolution of its
themes). For a brief description of California's utility-sponsored demand side

management programs, including programs targeted at promoting efficiency
adoption and energy curtailment, see Elsia 0. Galawish, DSM Accomplishments
in California:PG&E'sExperience, 9 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1295, 1296 (1996).
102. See Charles, supra note 3, at 805.
103.

Id.

104. James Sweeney & Anant Sudarshan, Deconstructing the "Rosenfeld
Curve" 1 (June 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://piee
.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/docs/publications/Deconstructing the RosenfeldCurve.pdf.
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II. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Given the importance of behavioral insights, the pressing
question is how to integrate them successfully into regulatory
analysis. Agency officials have begun to make regulatory decisions that reflect behavioral considerations.10 5 OIRA officials,
for example, have announced an intention to broaden traditional cost-benefit analysis to explicitly include such considerations and have provided initial points for agencies to consider. 106 But a framework has not yet emerged that can enable
regulators to conduct a systematic and concrete analysis of otherwise fairly disjointed and abstract considerations. 107 This
Part describes our initial efforts to fill that gap. Our framework
seeks to capture much of the complexity of human behavior
while remaining sufficiently simple to generate valuable insights for agencies at each stage in the regulatory process.
We enrich the current thinking among agencies and legal
scholars in three ways. First, we add a new line of analysis
based on the assumption that individuals seek to maximize
utility not only through wealth or monetary outcomes, but also
through social outcomes. Second, once we recognize the consideration of social outcomes, a further distinction between rational and extra-rational naturally follows, just as it does for
the consideration of monetary outcomes. We specify the considerations for determining when individuals are likely to engage
in extra-rational action under both assumptions, noting a considerable degree of symmetry. In this way, we are able to build
a set of complementary considerations for proceeding logically
through both sorts of analyses. Finally, we demonstrate that
rational and extra-rational considerations should be analyzed
for different populations-individual, household, local community, and so on. If individuals respond differently when they act
independently rather than as a part of a larger group, agencies
should consider a decision in terms of the range of influences
that it is likely to exert and the range of behavioral responses
that it is likely to elicit.
105. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 5, at 1.
106. See, e.g., id. (noting OMB recommendation to agencies to consider
"behaviorally informed approaches to regulation"); 2010 OIRA Disclosure
Memo, supra note 5, at 2-12 (providing guidance to agencies).
107. Cf. Adler, supra note 20, at 142-43 (noting the importance of bounded
rationality for regulatory decisionmakers); Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 150845 (providing a general framework for use of behavioral economics in development of legal prescriptions).
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A. UPDATING THE RATIONALITY AND MONETARY OUTCOME
ASSUMPTIONS

The analytical framework we develop begins to address the
problem that regulatory decisionmakers have limited time and
resources available to identify desired outcomes and to understand the regulatory influences on the behavior of regulatory
targets. 108 Our framework starts with the assumptions that individuals seek to maximize utility when considering both
wealth or monetary outcomes and social outcomes. It then
splits each assumption into two prongs based on whether the
individual is likely to engage in rational or extra-rational decisionmaking. We diagram the analytical framework in Figure 1.
Although our framework is not designed to yield a simple,
quantitative outcome about the most desirable regulatory approach, it will enable agencies to engage in a more complete
analysis of the influences on behavior.
Figure 1. Analytical Framework

1. Monetary Outcomes
a. RationalAction
Although utility maximization in theory may include "everything that an individual might value," 109 nonmonetary fac108.

See Adler, supra note 20, at 155-57.

109. Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18
(2002).
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tors are difficult to account for; thus, in practice the regulatory
analysis often focuses largely on wealth or monetary outcomes. 110 A vast literature explores this approach, and we do
not seek to contribute to that literature here. In this section, we
emphasize the importance of not assuming that the target population has adequate information across a number of regulatory domains.
i. Inaccurate Information
Individuals often fail to act in classically self-interested
ways because of incomplete or inaccurate information. For example, individuals list saving money as a primary reason for
their decisions about when and how long to idle their vehicle;
however, the average individual also believes she should idle
for over 4 minutes before it becomes cost-effective to turn off
the vehicle.111 In fact, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) recommends idling for no more than thirty seconds to
save gas, and to prevent vehicle wear and tear. 112 In many cases, agency officials have implemented policy mechanisms to ensure access to accurate and up-to-date information, such as the
institution of labeling requirements or hazard warnings. 113 In
other cases, however, agency officials have underestimated or
overlooked the knowledge deficits that exist and therefore
missed opportunities for lower cost, more effective, and less invasive regulations. For example, campaigns to update idling beliefs in multiple communities have resulted in idling reductions
on the order of thirty percent. 114 Updating beliefs about idling
may be far less expensive and far more politically viable than
direct regulation of driving behavior or increasing the price of
gasoline. 115 Moreover, in some cases a price mechanism should
110. See Adler, supra note 20, at 158-59; Scott, supra note 55, at 1621-22.
111. Amanda R. Carrico et al., Costly Myths: An Analysis of Idling Beliefs
and Behavior in PersonalMotor Vehicles, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 2881, 2885 (2009).
112. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, YOUR CAR AND CLEAN AIR: WHAT YOU
CAN DO TO REDUCE POLLUTION 3 (1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/

OMS/consumer/18-youdo.pdf.
113. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption By Preamble:FederalAgencies
and the Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 230 (2007) (discussing mandatory agency safety requirements such as "product performance,
design, labeling, warnings, and instructions").
114. MCKENZIE-MOHR ASsoCS., ANTI-IDLING FINAL REPORT 4 (2003),
available at http://www.greatersudbury.calcontentlearthcare/documents/Sudbury
finalreport.pdf.
115. OIRA recently described these types of informational regulatory tools
as "summary disclosure." 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 3-6
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be combined with information to be effective. Increasing the
cost of gasoline, for example, will not reduce gas use or carbon
emissions from idling if individuals believe they should idle far
longer than necessary to save gas and money. Of course, where
barriers such as cost, access, or convenience prevent an individual from adopting a behavior, education is often necessary
but not sufficient.
ii. Insufficient Information
In addition to outdated or incorrect beliefs, surveys reveal
large knowledge deficits regarding opportunities for household
energy efficiency. 116 Because the breakdown of how energy is
used in the home is generally invisible to homeowners, consumers often have little idea where the opportunities for efficiency and conservation exist.11 7 This problem has been analogized to the situation a shopper would face if a grocery store did
not list prices on each item and only provided a total, nonitemized bill at the time of check-out. 118 Not surprisingly, consumers overemphasize the impact of curtailment behaviors
(i.e., turning off lights and appliances), which are often more
visible in the consumer's mind, and underemphasize the impact
of efficiency upgrades.11 9
Information in the form of real-time feedback can recouple
specific behaviors with their associated energy costs, giving
consumers more information about which appliances and behaviors have the greatest effect on their monthly energy bills.
As discussed above, estimates suggest that home energy meters
(identifying the seven principles for agency use of summary disclosure as a
regulatory tool). It may be important not only to provide more information, but
also to attend to the way in which the information is provided. Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1533-34.
116. NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 91, at 36-37 (citing studies that
show that most energy users are ill informed of appliance energy usage under
aggregate billing systems).
117. Id. at 36 (explaining how energy bills are received infrequently and
aggregate energy use into one total).
118. See id. at 36-38; Willett Kempton & Laura Montgomery, Folk Quantification of Energy, 7 ENERGY 817, 817 (1982). OJRA recently recognized that
agencies "should take steps to provide people with relevant information when
they are actually making the decision or taking the action in question." 2010
OJRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that Principle Four is that
"[d]isclosed information should be properly placed and timed").
119. Shahzeen Z. Attari et al., Public Perceptions of Energy Consumption
and Savings, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16,054, at 16,055 (2010); Willett
Kempton et al., Do Consumers Know "What Works" in Energy Conservation?,9
MARRIAGE FAM. REV. 115, 115-33 (1985).
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can reduce household energy use. 120 In a 1979 study, McClelland and Cook installed monitors in a group of households that
displayed the home's energy usage in terms of cents per hour.
These households reduced energy use by twelve percent relative to a control group over the course of an eleven-month period. 12 1 Similarly, product-integrated feedback displays, such as
those that provide real-time fuel economy data in vehicles, have
been associated with roughly a ten-percent improvement in vehicle fuel economy due to changes in driving habits. 122 Regulatory approaches that assume that price is the only meaningful
influence on behavior may miss the opportunity to achieve
those ten- to fifteen-percent gains simply through feedback. If
the assumption is that price changes or direct regulation of the
timing or amount of household electricity use are necessary,
the resulting policies may generate a public backlash such as
the one that defeated the initial smart meter proposal in Maryland. 123 In short, for individuals who lack adequate information, the behavioral literature may enable regulators to develop
successful near-term approaches that they would otherwise
miss.
b. Extra-RationalAction
The notion that individuals sometimes seek to maximize
wealth or monetary outcomes but do so in extra-rational ways
accounts for many of the insights of behavioral economics. To
ensure that these insights are adequately reflected in regulatory analysis, scholars have translated information from a broad
range of studies into key findings or lessons. 12 4 To assess shifts
120. See ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INST., RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY USE
FEEDBACK: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS AND ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 2-5 (2009)

(reviewing studies on various forms of monitoring and feedback for home
energy consumers); Abrahamse et al., supra note 88, at 278 (same).
121. Lou McClelland & Stuart W. Cook, Energy Conservation Effects of
Continuous In-Home Feedback in All-Electric Homes, 9 J. ENVTL. SYS. 169,
169-73 (1979).
122. See Jack N. Barkenbus, Eco-Driving.-An Overlooked Climate Change
Initiative, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 762, 765-66 (2010) (showing a ten-percent gain in
fuel economy); Mascha van der Voort et al., A Prototype of Fuel-Efficiency
Support Tool, 9 C. TRANSP. RES. 279, 279 (2001) (showing a sixteen-percent
gain); Press Release, Scania Grp., Scania Takes Eco-Driving to a New Level
with Its Latest Digital Performance Coaching Technology (Sept. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.scania.com/media/pressreleases/nO9025en.aspx.
123. See Behr, supra note 96.
124. See, e.g., ARIELY, supra note 2, at xxix-xxx; Rabin, supra note 2, at
13-32; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 63, at 452.
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in the willingness of individuals to alter their behavior in response to a price increase or signal, a regulator can incorporate
these findings or lessons, asking whether the type of targeted
behavior reflects the type of conditions under which individuals
have been demonstrated to depart from traditional rationality
assumptions. The regulator can then adjust recommendations
to address these extra-rational responses. We gather some of
these core findings or lessons here.
i. Hyperbolic Discounting
Despite an attractive return on investment that follows the
purchase of many efficient products and appliances, such as
those carrying the Energy Star label, consumers have shown a
tendency to undervalue the savings associated with reduced
operating costs. 125 Some have argued that this may be attributed to uncertainties in the consumer's mind about the expected savings of the product or future energy costs; 126 however, there is also evidence that individuals simply overlook
operating costs altogether when not prompted to consider
them1 27 or miscalculate potential savings when they do. 128 Research in the social and behavioral sciences suggests that welldesigned information, particularly when provided at the point
of decisionmaking, can help to overcome steep discount rates or

125.

See Kenneth Gillingham et al., Energy Efficiency Economics and Poli-

cy, 1 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 597, 605-07 (2009); Jerry A. Hausman, Indi-

vidual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-Using Durables, 10 BELL J. ECON. 33, 50 (1979); Richard Howarth & Alan H. Sanstad,
Discount Rates and Energy Efficiency, 13 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 101, 101
(1995); Jonathan G. Koomey & Alan H. Sanstad, Technical Evidence for Assessing the Performance of Markets Affecting Energy Efficiency, 22 ENERGY
POL'Y 826, 828-30 (1994); Peter Kooreman, Individual Discounting, Energy
Conservation,and Household Demand for Lighting, 18 RESOURCE & ENERGY
ECON. 103, 112 (1996).

126. See Adam B. Jaffe et al., The Economics of Energy Efficiency, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY 79, 85-86 (Cutler Cleveland ed., 2004); Ronald J.
Sutherland, Market Barriers to Energy-Efficiency Investments, 12 ENERGY J.

15, 31 (1991).
127. See Daniel C. Feiler & Jack B. Soll, A Blind Spot in Driving Decisions:
How Neglecting Costs Puts Us in Overdrive, 98 CLIMATIC CHANGE 285, 289
(2010); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and BehavioralBiology,
105 CoLUM. L. REV. 405, 444-45 (2005).

128. See Willet Kempton et al., IAlways Turn It on "Super": User Decisions
About When and How to Operate Room Air Conditioners, 18 ENERGY &
BUILDINGS 177, 189-90 (1992); Kempton & Montgomery, supra note 118, at 826.
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may prime the individual to consider operating costs when
making decisions about product purchase and use. 1 2 9
ii. Cognitive Costs
An often overlooked but important example of a departure
from rationality-at least as to monetary outcomes-is the remarkably high value that individuals place on cognitive
costs. 130 Traditional rational-actor models tend to underestimate the cognitive costs of seeking out and evaluating information, as well as the cognitive benefit of avoiding hassles. Yet,
the convenience of an action stands out as a primary predictor
of whether an individual chooses to adopt it. For example, regardless of an individual's environmental values and beliefs,
the availability of curbside recycling is the single strongest
predictor of whether a household recycles. 13 1 Similarly, researchers have found that simply relocating recycling bins a
few feet inside of a room, rather than outside the door, can decrease the number of aluminum cans thrown in the conventional trash by half. 132 It is probably for this reason that individuals so often revert to the status quo when making
decisions. A good illustration of this can be found in rates of organ donation. The proportion of the population consenting to
donate their organs is roughly sixty percent higher in countries
that use an opt-out policy (where the default option is a consent
to donate) rather than an opt-in policy as it is in the United
States (where the default option is not to donate). The margin
of difference in actual organ donation is substantially smaller,
but it remains sixteen percent higher in the presence of an optout policy.133
129. Feiler & Soll, supra note 127, at 289.
130. OJRA recently recognized the importance of considering cognitive
costs during regulatory development. See 2010 OJRA Disclosure Memo, supra
note 5, at 4, 10 (noting that "[pleople have limited time and attention" and
thus "may not participate in important programs simply because the required
steps for participation are complex and daunting; agencies can often improve
outcomes by reducing unnecessary paperwork burdens and simplifying choices").
131. Glenda Wall, Barriersto Individual EnvironmentalAction: The Influence of Attitudes and Social Experiences, 32 CANADIAN REV. SOC. &
ANTHROPOLOGY 465, 477 (1995).

132. Timothy D. Ludwig et al., IncreasingRecycling in Academic Buildings:
A Systematic Replication, 31 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 683, 683 (1998).

133. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302
SCIENCE 1338, 1339 (2003). OJRA recently included default settings among
the alternatives that agencies should consider when designing regulatory options. 2010 OJRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that regulatory
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Policies and programs that recognize the importance of
convenience to individuals, despite the attractiveness of the options at stake, have greater chances of success. For example,
home efficiency rebate programs that require the extra step of a
home energy audit to be eligible to participate are less successful than those that do not. 134 Similarly, programs that simplify
the process for collecting benefits are also likely to encourage
greater levels of participation. 1 3 5 Imposing paperwork burdens
to ensure accountability may unintentionally dissuade participation, thereby reducing the program's overall effectiveness.
For example, although the environmental impacts of the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act13 6 (CARS, more
commonly known as Cash for Clunkers) have been criticized, 137
from a behavioral standpoint it was a resounding success. In
addition to other factors such as an attractive incentive package138 and a highly visible marketing campaign, the CARS program offered an instantaneous rebate1 39 and placed the paperwork burden on the car industry rather than the consumer. 140
One can compare this to state incentive programs to install
photovoltaics (PV) in households, where consumers must grapple with competing technical requirements depending on the
state or utility, as well as the complex task of selling certificates to collect their incentives. 14 1 Not surprisingly, consumer

outcomes "sometimes ... can be achieved by selecting appropriate starting
points or 'default rules').
134. Paul C. Stern, Information, Incentives, and Proenvironmental Consumer Behavior, 22 J. CONSUMER POL'Y. 461, 469 (1999).
135. Paul C. Stern et al., The Effectiveness of Incentives for Residential
Energy Conservation, 10 EVALUATION REV. 147, 159 (1986) [hereinafter Stern

et al., Effectiveness of Incentives]; Paul C. Stern, Gerald T. Gardner, Michael
P. Vandenbergh, Thomas Dietz & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Design Principlesfor
Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 44 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4847, 4848

(2010) [hereinafter Stern et al., Design Principles].
136. 49 U.S.C. § 32901 (2010).
137. See, e.g., Lee Schipper, Op-Ed., When It Comes to Being Green, Cash
for Clunkers Is a Lemon, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/graphic2009/08/08/GR2009080802658.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
138. See 49 U.S.C. § 32901(b).
139. See id.
140. See id. § 32901(c)-(d).
141. See Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral
Wedge: Designing and Adopting Effective Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,547, at 10,551 (2010).
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responses to these programs reflect the differences in cognitive
costs imposed on the consumer.142
iii. Framing
Although traditional rational-actor models typically assume that individuals hold a stable set of preferences, work
within social psychology and behavioral economics suggests
that preferences can be heavily dependent on the context in
which choices are presented to the individual. 143 For example,
the average individual claims to prefer a hamburger that is described as "75% lean" more than one described as "25% fat." 144
In many cases, frames elicit known systematic deviations from
rationality. For example, Kahnemann and Tversky demonstrated the tendency for losses to loom larger than gains where
individuals assign a higher subjective value to an amount that
is to be lost rather than an amount that is to be gained. 145 For
this reason, framing an efficiency investment as an opportunity
to avoid losses, rather than to achieve gains (as it is more typically framed), is likely to induce more to invest. For regulators,
understanding how frames influence individuals' perceptions of
costs and benefits may assist them in devising more effective
policies and programs, particularly those involving public education.
2. Social Outcomes
The second assumption of our analytical framework accounts in a systematic way for insights about the importance of
social outcomes from research in social psychology, sociology,
and behavioral economics. We describe this line of analysis below. From a procedural perspective, our best thinking is that an
agency would consider social outcomes after examining monetary outcomes.
142. For a more detailed review, see Stern et al., Design Principles, supra
note 135, at 4847-48.
143. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 2, at 343-44; Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 63, at 453. OIRA recently noted the need for agencies
to consider framing and loss aversion in the design of summary disclosure
regulatory measures. See 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supranote 5, at 4 ("[I1f
a potential outcome is presented as a loss, for example, people may pay more
attention than if it is presented as a gain.").
144. Irwin P. Levin & Gary J. Gaeth, How Consumers Are Affected by the
Framingof Attribute Information Before and After Consuming the Product, 15
J. CONSUMER RES. 374, 375-77 (1988).
145. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 2, at 342; Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 63, at 456.
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Before we begin, we note that our description of extrarational responses to social outcome maximization is necessarily tentative because less research exists concerning such responses. A possible reason is that the category has been largely
overlooked. Because social psychologists and sociologists often
use an expansive definition of rationality, they tend to mute
somewhat the idea of extra-rational responses. 146 Similarly,
economists often examine extra-rational behavior, but they
tend to focus on monetary outcomes, rather than social outcomes. 14 7 Thus, consideration of extra-rational responses to social outcome maximization, though suggested by existing research, has largely fallen through the cracks.
In addition, we recognize that social outcomes are highly
subjective and difficult to define, and that it is difficult to distinguish between rational and extra-rational behavior within
this category. For example, social outcomes could be broadened
to include the experience of psychological well-being that is associated with helping another, therefore making it rational for
the individual to engage in seemingly self-sacrificial behavior
with no direct social reward (e.g., making an anonymous donation). Some psychologists have taken this approach. 148 We do
not intend to dismiss or oversimplify this issue, but it is not
necessary to resolve it to offer regulators a tool for incorporating broader considerations of social outcomes into regulatory
analysis. Toward this end, we define a social outcome as a social reward or punishment. 149 So defined, social outcomes in146. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 63, at 453 ("The definition
of rationality has been much debated, but there is general agreement that rational choices should satisfy some elementary requirements of consistency and
coherence.").
147. See, e.g., id. at 454.
148. See, e.g., Robert B. Cialdini et al., Empathy-Based Helping: Is It Selflessly or Selfishly Motivated?, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 749, 74950 (1987) (arguing that the empathy for another in need leads to the experience of sadness in the observer, motivating him or her to relieve that sadness
through helping, and providing data to suggest that empathy is associated
with sadness and those who were led to believe that helping would not reduce
empathy were less likely to help others).
149. See Howard Margolis, Free Riding Versus Cooperation, in STRATEGY
AND CHOICE 84, 90 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991) ("[T]he possibilities
... could come either from imposing a risk of punishment on those who fail to
cooperate or offering the promise of reward for those who do."); cf. Jon Elster,
Social Norms and Economic Theory, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 99, 100
(noting that social norms are "enforced by members of the general community"
and are "sustained by the approval and disapproval of others" and providing
several examples).
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clude the expectation of negative social attention on the basis of
beliefs about what is typical or approved of within a group. 150
They also include social status that one achieves through engaging in behaviors that have symbolic significance within a
group. 15 1 We believe that many regulators will find this definition intuitively appealing, even if they currently lack the information and framework to incorporate these behavioral tendencies into regulatory analysis. Providing an initial
framework is our main goal here. Below we identify the types of
factors that regulators should consider.
Because the extra-rational social outcome category flows
from existing research, we believe that it must be included in
any thorough framework for analyzing behavioral effects, even
if necessarily tentative. We hope that including it in the
framework will draw attention to the potential importance of
this area and the need for further research. 152
a. RationalAction
To analyze rational decisionmaking as to social outcome
maximization, we draw together various insights from the literature. As with our discussion of rational action in pursuit of
wealth maximization, 15 3 we begin here with a phenomenon that
arises from a lack of information or misinformation. In this
case, we examine behavioral insights on how misinformation
regarding others' behavior can affect the behavior of those who
are seeking to maximize social outcomes. We also demonstrate
how these insights can lead to regulatory innovations.
i. Inadequate Information-Pluralistic Ignorance
Individuals sometimes modify their behavior on the basis
of an expected social reward or sanction that rests on misinformation about what others do or what they value. For example, pluralistic ignorance describes the situation in which the
majority of individuals within a group publicly accept a social

150.

See Margolis, supra note 149, at 90-95.

151.

See, e.g., ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 146-

54 (1984) (discussing the roles of labels, hierarchies, stereotypes, and
reputation).
152. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1116 (noting how the use
of a legal analytical framework identified the overlooked importance of an entitlement in the case of a polluter protected by a liability rule).
153. See supra notes 109-45 and accompanying text.
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norm that they privately reject. 154 It is the incorrect perception
that the majority of those around them personally accept the
norm that leads to the perpetuation of the norm. 155 Ultimately,
this motivates a behavioral response that is consistent with a
widely rejected value. 15 6 Pluralistic ignorance is thought to contribute to socially undesirable behavior in a number of domains. 15 7 For example, college students report the belief that
the majority of other students on campus believe that heavy
drinking is considered acceptable and is a common behavior on
campus. 15 8 In reality, students tend to overestimate the amount
of drinking that their peers actually engage in. 159 The illusion
of descriptive and injunctive norms for drinking has been
shown to be related to actual drinking behavior on campuses,
and interventions to promote a more accurate norm have been
shown to reduce drinking on campuses. 16 0
ii. Descriptive Norms
Numerous social psychological studies have found that individuals often follow the crowd in the absence of strong preferences that direct them otherwise. In his classic study, Solomon
Asch demonstrated that seventy-five percent of participants
were willing to volunteer an obviously incorrect response to a
simple question so as not to deviate from the consensus response within the group. 16 1 Consistent with this finding, psychologists have revealed that calling attention to common behaviors within a population (a descriptive norm) will induce

154. DANIEL KATZ & FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, STUDENTS' ATTITUDES 15253 (1931).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. In addition to the example of college drinking that follows, social
scientists have speculated that pluralistic ignorance was responsible for the
widespread public support for segregation among white Americans during the

1960's, Hubert J. O'Gorman, Pluralistic Ignorance and White Estimates of
White Support for Racial Segregation, 39 PUB. OPINION Q. 313, 330 (1975), as
well as the support of communism within the Soviet Union, TIMUR KURAN,
PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES 118-27 (1995).
158. Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, PluralisticIgnorance and Alco-

hol Use on Campuses: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social Norm,
64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 243, 245 (1993); Christine M. Schroeder

& Deborah A. Prentice, Exposing PluralisticIgnorance to Reduce Alcohol Use
Among
159.
160.
161.

College Students, 28 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2150, 2170-74 (1998).
Schroeder & Prentice, supra note 158, at 2170-74.
Id.
Asch, supra note 62, at 181-82.
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other individuals to also adopt that behavior.162 For example, in
two large-scale evaluations conducted in Sacramento and the
Puget Sound area, researchers randomly selected customers of
electric utilities to receive periodic peer feedback reports. These
reports included a bar graph displaying the customer's recent
monthly electricity use compared to a group of comparable
neighbors as well as "efficient neighbors." 163 Individuals who
received these reports used one to two percent less energy than
those that did not. These savings persisted up to a year after
the intervention was initiated.164 Interestingly, households that
used less than their efficient peers showed a slight increase in
energy use, referred to as a "boomerang effect," 165 reinforcing
the impact of descriptive norms.
Although logical on the surface, this psychological principle
flies against the instincts of many who develop programs to
change behavior.1 66 Messages are often designed to convey the
scale of the problem by bringing attention to an undesirable
behavior. For example, a public education campaign designed
to reduce drunk driving may reference the hundreds of thousands of Americans pulled over for drunk driving each year. By
doing this, however, a campaign may promote the belief that
162. Noah J. Goldstein et al., A Room with a Viewpoint: Using Social
Norms to Motivate Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 J. CONSUMER
RES. 472, 479-80 (2008) (finding that prescriptive norms increased participation in hotel energy conservation programs); P. Wesley Schultz, ChangingBehavior With Normative Feedback Interventions: A Field Experiment on Curbside Recycling, 21 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 25, 31-33 (1998)
[hereinafter Schultz, Changing Behavior] (finding that individual feedback increased curbside recycling); P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. ScI. 429,
432 (2007) [hereinafter Schultz et al., Power of Social Norms] (finding that
providing residents with normative feedback decreased home energy usage).
163. Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer
Comparison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage 5 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,386, 2009), available at http://www
.nber.org/papers/wl5386.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative
Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in
Human Behavior, 24 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 202, 208-09
(1991) (noting the perverse side effect of an antilittering campaign that implicitly acknowledged that many people litter).
166. Cf. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (citing law and economics research
that acknowledges the occasional trumping power of internalized norms over
external incentives); Posner, supra note 69, at 1781 (acknowledging the role of
internalized norms in tax compliance).
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the behavior, though undesirable, is widespread. For example,
Arizona's Petrified Forest National Park estimated that over a
ton of petrified wood was stolen from their park per month.16 7
In response to this problem they placed signs throughout the
park reading: "Your heritage is being vandalized every day by
theft losses of petrified wood of 14 tons a year, mostly a small
piece at a time."1 68 By doing this, the park was inadvertently
encouraging theft by communicating the idea that defection is
the norm and that one will be in the minority by adopting the
desirable behavior. When the sign was changed to simply communicate that removing wood is undesirable (an injunctive
norm) rates of theft declined from eight percent to just under
two percent. 169
iii. The Attitude-Behavior Gap
Despite the large amount of attention given to attitudes in
behavioral research, attitudes tend to be relatively poor predictors of behavior. 170 Attitudes often correlate well with intentions to act a certain way; however, there are a host of physical,
structural, and psychological barriers that may prevent people
from acting the way that they feel. For example, individuals
may strongly value health and fitness, but these feelings may
be overcome by competing influences such as time constraints,
the availability of healthy food options, and socio-cultural factors that may influence food preferences and options. For these
reasons, marketing a behavior is very different from marketing
a product. Successful behavior-change interventions must take
a systematic approach to understanding the barriers that prevent an individual from acting on his or her intentions.1 7 1 In
cases where the primary barriers include a lack of awareness or
actionable knowledge, a well-crafted education campaign may
be sufficient to promote behavior change. More often than not,
however, social marketing must go beyond informational approaches to also target issues such as convenience, access, safe-

167. Robert B. Cialdini, Crafting Normative Messages to Protect the Environment, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 105, 107 (2003).

168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
See,

e.g.,

Icek

Ajzen,

The

Theory

of Planned Behavior, 50

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 179, 180 (1991) (not-

ing the relatively poor predictive power of dispositions as well as general attitudes in predicting specific behaviors).
171. See McKENZIE-MOHR & SMITH, supra note 6, at 122-32.
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ty, or psychological barriers such as perceptions of efficacy and
control.172

iv. Motivational Crowding
By focusing solely on wealth or monetary outcome maximization, agency officials can inadvertently crowd out rational
processes of social utility maximization that could work in their
favor. For example, a group of Israeli day care centers found
that when they introduced a fine to prevent parents from arriving late to pick up their children, the number of late parents
nearly doubled. 173 Applying an economic cost or benefit to a decision that is otherwise governed by moral or injunctive norms
can change the subjective payoff structure, thereby reducing intrinsic motivation in lieu of external or economic motivation. 174
In other words, the parents in the Israeli day care example
were more willing to incur the economic cost of arriving late
than the social cost of inconveniencing the day care instructors. 175
Agency officials should be careful to avoid introducing economic incentives or penalties to change behaviors that may already be governed by injunctive norms. For example, littering
in public parks or choosing to water one's lawn during a
drought may be more influenced by appeals to social responsibility than by a threat of fines that, in many cases, are insufficiently large or are difficult to enforce. When economic incentives are deemed appropriate, regulators also should consider
reinforcing injunctive norms surrounding the target behavior
through other avenues. Studies suggest a synergistic effect
when incentives or fines are paired with a public education
campaign to reinforce the moral case for engaging in a behavior. 176 Anecdotal evidence of this can be seen in the response to
172. Id.
173. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 3-8 (2000).

174. See Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May
Undermine "The Moral Sentiments"- Evidence from Economic Experiments,
320 SCIENCE 1605, 1609 (2008); Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review

of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 658-59 (1999); Bruno S. Frey, Motivation as
a Limit to Pricing, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 635, 658 (1993); Ann E. Tenbrunsel

& David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and Cooperation,
44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684, 704 (1999).
175. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 173, at 3-8.
176. See LURA CONSULTING, THE CARROT, THE STICK, AND THE COMBO: A
RECIPE FOR REDUCING VEHCLE IDLING IN CANADIAN COMMUNITIES 6-7 (2005),
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Ireland's decision to introduce a modest tax on plastic grocery
bags paired with an aggressive media campaign. 177 The effect
on plastic bag usage far surpassed the expected cumulative effects of these policies. 178 Within weeks, the use of plastic bags
dropped by ninety-four percent and the social stigma of being
seen carrying a plastic bag was likened to that of "wearing a fur
coat or not cleaning up after a dog." 179
b. Extra-RationalAction
Accounting for extra-rational responses to social outcomes
is an essential area of regulatory analysis, yet one that is largely off the radar screen even for those who recognize the importance of understanding the role of extra-rational behavior in
monetary outcome maximization. Studies suggest that many of
the same types of departures from rationality that afflict monetary outcome maximization also afflict social outcome maximization.18 0 Social outcome preferences are context specific, as are
monetary outcome preferences. 181 Individuals have a limited
ability to process social information, as with monetary information. 182 Individuals are affected by having committed verbally
or in writing, even if there is no monetary or social sanction.183
Of course, individuals also have personal norms that sometimes
influence behavior in ways that are inconsistent with monetary
or social outcome maximization. 184 For example, within a target

available at http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/communities-government/transportation/
municipal-communities/reports/carrot-stick-combo/carrot-stick-combo.pdf
(advising that both voluntary and regulatory approaches should be used in tandem); David T. Levy et al., The Effects of Tobacco Control Policies on Smoking
Rates: A Tobacco Control Scorecard, 10 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 338,
346-49 (2004) ("[Tihe most successful tobacco control strategies appear to involve multiple policies implemented as part of a comprehensive strategy.").
177. See Rosenthal, supra note 13, at A3. Similarly, combining public education with regulatory measures has also been successfully used to reduce vehicle idling in a number of Canadian communities. See LURA CONSULTING, supra note 176, at 8-20.

178. See Rosenthal, supra note 13, at A3 ("And then something happened
that was bigger than the sum of these parts.").
179.

Id.

180. See infra Parts II.A.2.b.i-iii.
181. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.i.
182. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.ii.
183. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.iii.
184. See Susanne Gbckeritz et al., Descriptive Normative Beliefs and Conservation Behavior: The ModeratingRoles of PersonalInvolvement and Injunctive Normative Beliefs, 40 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 514, 517 (2010) (describing
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population such as individuals and households, the expected
utility of an outcome may be a poor predictor of a behavior
when there are strong injunctive norms associated with an action (e.g., littering in a public space), rather than when society
views a behavior as morally neutral (e.g., idling a vehicle in a
public space).
i. Framing
Framing yields examples of extra-rational behavior when
individuals seek to maximize social outcomes. Frames can interact with an individual's previous experiences or ideological
worldview to trigger certain responses as they do with an individual's sense of monetary value. 185 For example, the term tax
triggers many negative associations among those who are ideologically conservative that the term offset does not. Consequently, more Republicans (and independents) are willing to
purchase a more expensive product when its cost is increased
due to a "carbon offset," rather than a "carbon tax." 186 In other
words, individual preferences for monetary wealth over social
wealth vary depending on the context. Similarly, framing an
issue in terms of the proposed solutions can affect the perceived
severity of that problem. For example, liberals tend to perceive
climate change as more problematic when the solution involves
environmental regulation rather than when it involves nuclear
power; the opposite pattern is true of conservatives. 187
Given the way that humans process information using cognitive heuristics and previous experiences as a filter, it is simply impossible to avoid framing information. 188 Instead of attempting to avoid framing effects, regulators should consult
behavioral scientists when framing information. Regulators
should be careful to avoid frames that may be polarizing or
prevent audience members from fully considering an argument
or policy proposal. Similarly, we should not assume from an inithe moderating effect of personal involvement on behavioral change and information processing).
185. David J. Hardisty et al., A Dirty Word or a Dirty World? Attribute
Framing, Political Affiliation, and Query Theory, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 86, 88
(2010); see also 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 4 ("Agencies
should be aware of the importance of how information is presented. . .
186. Hardisty et al., supra note 185, at 86, 89.
187. Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study 46 (Oct. 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1017189.
188. See id. at 2, 16.
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tial negative reaction that the public is unwilling to accept certain policy measures. Reframing an issue in a way that challenges preconceived beliefs may stimulate more thoughtful consideration of an issue.
ii. Habits
Psychological research suggests that individuals often behave inconsistently with their attitudes or beliefs due to a reliance on automatic processing in decisionmaking. 189 Psychologists have hypothesized that many "decisions" actually occur
outside the range of cognition.190 A habit, in the psychological
sense, is a behavior that is the result of "automatic cognitive
processes" due to an "extensive repetition" of that behavior.19 1
Additional work suggests that habits often supplement the
cognitive process of decisionmaking or even override attitudinal
preferences and normative influences on behavior altogether,
leading to outcomes that may be in conflict with social outcome
maximization. 192 An understanding of the role of habits is critical for anticipating the appropriate policy measure to influence
behavior change. For example, anti-idling laws or public education campaigns may be ineffective for segments of the public
that have been "trained" to idle their vehicles for extended periods. 193 New vehicle technologies such as integrated startergenerators provide a relatively low-cost technological solution

189. Ola Svenson, Differentiation and Consolidation Theory of Human Decision Making: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Pre- and Post-Decision
Processes,80 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 145-46 (1992).
190. Id.
191. David L. Ronis et al., Attitudes, Decisions, and Habits as Determinants
of Repeated Behavior, in ATTITUDE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 213, 219 (Anthony R. Pratkanis et al. eds., 1989). For a discussion of habits in law and economics noting the work of Kenneth Arrow and concluding that habits "can be
incorporated into a theory by supposing that people choose goods with an eye
towards minimizing changes in their consumption", see Jolls et al., supra note
2, at 1478.
192. See Henk Aarts et al., Predicting Behavior from Actions in the Past:
Repeated DecisionMaking or a Matter of Habit?, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1355, 1358-61 (1998); Michel Laroche et al., The Influence of Culture on ProEnvironmental Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior: A CanadianPerspective,
23 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 196, 196 (1996).
193. In the case of motor vehicle idling, it was once considered more costeffective to idle for a period of time before driving or while waiting. See Carrico
et al., supra note 111, at 2882. With improvements in modern fuel-injection
engines, that is no longer the case. See id. However, many individuals are acting based on outdated information and old habits. See id.
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that does not rely on the consumer to unlearn or relearn a behavior. 194
iii. Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance refers to the psychological discomfort
that is felt when a person holds two contradictory ideas or cognitions. 195 This principle also extends to an inconsistency between an attitude or belief and a behavior. 196 Therefore, an individual who values personal health but also regularly smokes
cigarettes will likely experience a certain level of anxiety over
this inconsistency. 197 Dissonance reduction can be achieved by
modifying an attitude, belief, or behavior to create consistency. 198 When this is impossible or difficult, individuals will often
justify the inconsistency through rationalization. 199 Therefore,
continuing with the same example, a smoker may justify his or
her behavior by downplaying the risks of smoking. 200
Behavior change programs can take advantage of the need
for consistency by highlighting discrepancies between an individual's attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. 20 1 This is true even
when one's behavior is not directly observed. For example, students on a college campus that were reminded that they had
made a commitment to take shorter showers were more likely
to follow through with their pledge. 2 02 Clearly, it is not feasible
from a policy perspective to use this approach on a macro level;
however, studies have shown that simply asking individuals to
make an upfront commitment can also be an effective way to
encourage action, particularly when that commitment is made
publicly. 203 This is a principle that fundraising organizations
194. For a discussion of this technology, see id. at 2887.
195. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2-3 (1957).
196. See id. at 3.
197. See id. at 2.
198. See id. at 18-23.
199. See id. at 2.
200. See id.
201. See Chris Ann Dickerson et al., Using Cognitive Dissonance to Encourage Water Conservation, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 841, 852 (1992);
S.J. Kantola et al., Cognitive Dissonance and Energy Conservation, 69 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 416, 421 (1984).
202. See Dickerson et al., supra note 201, at 841.
203. See Richard D. Katzev & Theodore R. Johnson, Comparing the Effects
of Monetary Incentives and Foot-in-the-DoorStrategies in Promoting Residential Electricity Conservation, 14 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 12, 24-25 (1984); Michael S. Pallak & William Cummings, Commitment and Voluntary Energy
Conservation,2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 27, 27, 29 (1976).
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have utilized in large numbers. 204 Similarly, bringing attention
to one's behavior even in the absence of a public commitment
can also be effective. In the case of environmental policy, feedback indicating that an individual can do more to reduce environmental harm may induce dissonance among those who value environmental protection if they cannot otherwise
rationalize their actions. 205
As we suggest at the beginning of this section, this analysis
identifies the importance of developing new lines of research
within social psychology and sociology to complement behavioral economics. 206 This work should focus on the social outcome
maximization analog to monetary outcome maximization: Are
there predictable extra-rationalities in how individuals respond
to social outcomes? In the meantime, the analysis in this area
should proceed cautiously and incrementally.
B. ACCOUNTING FOR MULTIPLE LEVELS OF INFLUENCE

We have described two lines of analysis based on two different assumptions about individual behavior (the consideration of monetary outcomes and social outcomes) and, within
each, two types of individual responses (rational and extrarational). The analytical framework we have described so far
incorporates behavioral insights by providing not a mathematical formula with a quantitative outcome, but a structured set of
factors that agencies should consider when developing regulatory options and should add to the quantitative process when
conducting regulatory review. But so far the framework suggests that agencies should consider the effect of regulatory actions on individuals without considering whether their behavior changes when viewed in terms of the groupings that
subsume them-social networks, local communities, and national constituencies. 207 Drawing on the methodology of social
204. See Elizabeth G. Warner, Ask the Experts: Monthly Pledge Systems-A
FundraisingIdea for Nonprofits?, NONPROFIT WORLD, May-June, 1994, 4, 4-5
(explaining how monthly pledge systems can be easily set up and provide significant increases in revenue and core donor involvement).
205. See Clive Seligman & John M. Darley, Feedback as a Means of Decreasing Residential Energy Consumption, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 363, 36667 (1977).
206. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
207. OIRA has recently noted the importance of understanding the effects
of informational regulatory tools on subpopulations. For example, it has noted
that with regard to default rules it may be important for agencies to "distinguish among, and to suit the diverse situations of, members of the affected
group. For example, geographic or demographic information (such as age)
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psychology and sociology, in this section we suggest an additional round of analysis that accounts for these influences on
individual behavior.
Behavioral scientists have relied heavily on socio-ecological
frameworks (SEF) for organizing the set of influences on individual behavior and the interrelationships among these influences. 208 Although not a cohesive model used to make and test
predictions, SEFs are conceptual and organizational tools that
can focus regulators on different points of influence on behavior, including but not limited to economic influences. Typically,
SEFs represent multiple nested layers of influence such as individual-level factors, community-level factors, and others. 209
The number and specificity of the layers that are represented
depend on the context within which the SEF is used. 2 10 Agencies can begin with a framework that includes four levels of influence and expand where appropriate. The four levels include:
the individual, the immediate social environment (including
family, friends, and work), the community environment (including neighborhoods, cities, and states), and the broader national
and policy environment.
A sample SEF specific to the decision to invest in an energy
efficient product is provided in Figure 2. Factors such as the financial capability to purchase a new product as well as the
need for a new product are included as individual-level factors,
as are knowledge of product options and beliefs about the importance of efficiency. Factors such as vicarious experiences
with efficient products (i.e., via a friend or colleague) are
represented in Level 2, along with social norms regarding energy efficiency or environmentalism. The presence of vendors that
sell efficient products, the intermediaries that affect these decimight be taken into account if it helps to increase the likelihood that the default rule will be suited to the situations of those to whom it applies." 2010
OJRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 11.
208. Socio-ecological frameworks have been relied upon by researchers
working in the areas of developmental psychology, community psychology,
health psychology, and public health. See, e.g., URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE
ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1979) (applying an ecological framework
to the field of developmental psychology). For an example in public health literature applying an ecological framework in identifying environmental influences on physical activity, see James F. Sallis et al., An Ecological Approach to
CreatingActive Living Communities, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 297 (2006).
209. See, e.g., BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 208, at 3-4 (describing his
conceptual framework as "a set of nested structures, each inside the next, like
a set of Russian dolls").
210. Id.
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sions, and local policies that may affect these purchases (e.g.,
state efficiency requirements) are included in Level 3. Finally,
federal policy and the presence of cultural values and norms
are reflected in Level 4.
A factor within one level will interact with factors at other
levels. For example, federal policy, local policy, and peer networks will provide relevant information to the consumer about
his or her decision. Broader societal norms in Level 4 may contradict more group-specific social norms in Level 2 such as the
potential contradiction between materialism and environmentalism. Some factors may interact in synergistic ways such as a
policy to tax plastic bags which may reinforce a social norm to
use reusable bags. 2 11
Figure 2. Example of Social Ecological Framework Applied to Residential Efficiency Investments
Level 4-Nationa

Information
Disclosure Requiwayts
Federal Subsidies
Federal Efficiency
Standards
Level 3-Conununity
Community
Organizations
Local
Government (e..,eficiency standardis Inncemntae
.
rams)
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Availability
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Groups reigious groups, environmental groups)
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KnowledgelBeliefs
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This framework provides a systematic way in which agencies can consider the different levels of influence on behavior
and can look for opportunities where those influences may be
convergent and where they may conflict. An agency may recognize, for example, that resources spent on campaigns to promote public transportation in an effort to reduce ozone pollution are poorly allocated in communities that have no public

transportation infrastructure to support such behavior. Assum211.

See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
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ing sufficient statutory authority, the agency may decide to allocate more funding to infrastructure development or to campaigns that target behaviors that are more malleable such as
motor vehicle idling, other driving behavior, or vehicle maintenance. 2 12 Returning to the example of an energy efficient purchase, an agency may realize that federal programs to offset
the cost of a more efficient product may be bolstered by a similar program that incentivizes intermediaries to sell these products, therefore encouraging intermediaries to provide the relevant information regarding the operating costs that are often
missed due to extra-rational patterns of behavior. An agency
also may recognize that using a campaign to connect efficient
purchases to societal goals such as energy security or environmental protection may make social or personal norms more salient when purchase decisions are made.
Because regulation is, by its nature, generalized, an agency
may not be able to take account of responses at all scales. But
regulatory analysis is incomplete unless it at least considers
behavioral influences at multiple scales. At a minimum, agencies will be better positioned to prioritize factors that have the
greatest potential leverage on behavior or that may lead to policy failures if not addressed. Agencies also will be better positioned to enlist other regulators, such as state or communitylevel entities, to tailor policies and messages in ways that are
more appropriate for those populations. For example, a public
education campaign centered on the juxtaposition of energy security and environmental protection may resonate differently
in different communities.
III. ENERGY EXAMPLES
In this Part, we illustrate our framework by applying it to
concrete energy-use examples. We demonstrate how the
framework will operate and the findings it will yield. We refer
to energy and environmental studies wherever possible, but we
also draw on studies from other fields where the research is
particularly relevant and transferable. We first examine the
important role that our analytical framework might play in improving regulatory decisionmaking regarding electric cars, and
212. See, e.g., Congestion Mitigationand Air Quality (CMAQ) Improvement
Program, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/
cmaqpgs/ (last modified Sept. 22, 2009) (discussing the traffic-grant program,
which includes guidelines limiting spending to areas such as carpooling that
have high-technical potential but low-behavioral plasticity).
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we then turn to tankless water heaters. Although our examples
are drawn from the energy and environmental contexts, we believe that other areas of intense regulatory and political concern, such as antitrust, securities fraud, pension benefits, and
health care, are susceptible to the same sorts of considerations. 2 13
Some background on the issue of energy use is helpful to
demonstrate the relevance of behavioral analysis. Regulations
and policies that reduce energy demand will be a critical component of any successful U.S. energy policy or climate mitigation strategy,2 14 and the household sector is one of the most
promising areas for low-cost, prompt reductions in energy use
and carbon emissions. 215 The sector accounts for roughly forty
percent of U.S. carbon emissions as well as a comparable per213. See, e.g., J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Behavioral
Economics: Observations Regarding Issues That Lie Ahead, Address at the
Vienna Competition Conference (June 9, 2010), available at http://ftc.gov/
speeches/rosch/100609viennaremarks.pdf (discussing the case for using principles of behavioral economics in antitrust merger review). For commentary on
Rosch's speech, see Geoffrey Manne, Commissioner Rosch's Really Weak Case
for "BehavioralAntitrust," TRUTH ON MARKET (July 16, 2010, 12:46 PM),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/07/16/commissioner-roschs-really-weak-case
-for-behavioral-antitrust/. See also EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR & IRS, AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT 401(K) PLANS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES

3 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdflautomaticenrollment
401kplans.pdf (describing incentives for small businesses to switch to automatic enrollment of employees in 401(k) plans, with opt-out provisions); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,
1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 26-31 (1988) (identifying status quo bias in
health insurance purchases); Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Outlines New Initiatives Intended to Make It Easier to Save for Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
6, 2009, at A20, available at 2009 WL 17481341. In this Part, we apply the
monetary and social prongs of our proposed framework to electric car recharging and tankless water heater purchases, but in the interest of brevity we do
not apply a social ecological framework to these actions.
214. See Nathan S. Lewis, Powering the Planet, Keynote Speech at the California Clean Innovation Conference (May 11, 2007), in 2 ENGINEERING & SCI.
12, 19 (2007) ("[L]owering demand ... is going to pay off much sooner than
clean energy supplies."); S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving
the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305
SCIENCE 968, 969 (2004) ("Improvements in efficiency and conservation probably offer the greatest potential. . . .").
215.

See, e.g., FLORIAN BRESSAND

ET AL.,

MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST.,

CURBING GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND GROWTH: THE ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY
OPPORTUNITY 57 (2007) (noting that the residential sector provides the "largest energy productivity opportunities" globally); HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET
AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY
10 (2009) ("The residential sector ... offers a slightly disproportionate thirtyfive percent of the end-use efficiency potential.").
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centage of total U.S. energy consumption. 2 16 A recent analysis
concludes that behavioral measures targeting household conservation and efficiency could reasonably be expected to reduce
total U.S. emissions by over seven percent by 2020.217 This
amount is larger than the total emissions of France and exceeds the combined emissions from several of the largestemitting industrial sectors. 218 Additional analyses suggest that
efficiency and conservation are among the quickest and least
expensive alternatives available. 2 19
Although the household sector accounts for roughly forty
percent of U.S. energy use and carbon dioxide emissions, the
laws and policies directed at reductions from this sector often
reflect strong assumptions about the influence of price and thus
often overlook other influences on behavior. Despite the opportunity in the household sector and the increasing focus on
energy efficiency and conservation at the federal, state, and local levels, 220 recent regulatory and policy efforts are only beginning to tap the potential of this sector. A lack of information
about the most effective behavior change measures may contribute to a surprising barrier: the tendency to focus on behaviors
that involve the greatest energy use or carbon emissions (i.e.,
technical potential). Instead, behaviors should be evaluated
based not only on technical potential, but also behavioral plasticity.221 High technical potential means that modest changes

216. See Shui Bin & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Consumer Lifestyle Approach to
U.S. Energy Use and the Related CO 2 Emissions, 33 ENERGY POL'Y 197, 197
(2005); Gerald T. Gardner & Paul C. Stern, The Short List: The Most Effective
Actions U.S. Households Can Take to Curb Climate Change, 50 ENVIRONMENT,
no. 5, 2008 at 12, 16; Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1694 (2007).
217. Dietz et al., supra note 33, at 18,452.
218. Id. at 18,452-53.
219. See BRESSAND ET AL., supra note 215, at 57; Allcott & Mullainathan,
supra note 6, at 1204-05; Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon
Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1758 (2008).
220. For a summary of the household energy efficiency measures in the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115, which incorporates the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3807, see U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-10-383, RECOVERY ACT: PROJECT SELECTION AND STARTS ARE
INFLUENCED BY CERTAIN FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER FACTORS
(2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-383.
221. See Richard York et al., Bridging Environmental Science with Environmental Policy: Plasticity of Population,Affluence, and Technology, 83 SOC.
SCI. Q. 18, 31 (2002) ("Plasticity is a tool for bridging science with policy.").
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in behaviors have a substantial impact. 222 High behavioral
plasticity means that the behaviors are relatively easy to
change. 223 Areas of high technical potential but low plasticity
are important, but a growing body of research demonstrates
that many behaviors have high technical potential and high
behavioral plasticity. 224 They should be the initial focus of policy, and our electric car and tankless water heater examples
demonstrate the potential for regulators to use behavioral insights to affect these areas. 225
A. ELECTRIC CARS

The electric car example demonstrates how even early in
the development of regulations and policies rational action assumptions can begin to frame the regulatory options to exclude
behavioral insights. The emissions reduction potential and cost
of operating electric vehicles depend heavily on when individuals choose to charge those vehicles. 226 Drivers are most likely to
plug in their vehicles when they return home in the evening. 227
This timing coincides with peak-load energy use in the late afternoon and evening, when less efficient sources of electricity
generation are used to meet peak load demands. 228 Depending
on the mix of generating sources (coal, nuclear, gas, or renewable sources), recharging during peak periods may substantially
increase the carbon emissions and costs associated with electric
vehicles. 229 Recharging during peak periods also could increase
222. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 141, at 10,551.
223. Too much of the discussion to date has focused on behaviors that have
high-technical potential but low plasticity, such as shifting from individually
driven cars to carpooling. See Dietz et al., supra note 33, at 18,453.
224. See discussion infra Part III.A and Part III.B.
225. Cf. Vandenbergh et al., supra note 141, at 10,551.
226. A. ELGOWAINY ET AL., ARGONNE NAT'L LAB. CTR. FOR TRANSP.
RESEARCH, ENERGY SYS. DIv., WELL TO WHEELS ENERGY USE AND
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: ANALYSIS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC

VEHICLES 7 (2009) (discussing greenhouse gas emissions).
227. RYAN W. MCCARTHY ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS INST. OF TRANSP.
STUDIES, INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ELECTRIC-DRIVE VEHICLES AND THE
POWER SECTOR IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2009) (discussing greenhouse gas emissions

and demand for energy by time of day).
228. See ELGOWAINY ET AL., supra note 226, at 7; MCCARTHY ET AL., supra
note 227, at 7; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATL ACADS., TRANSITIONS
TO ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGIES-PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC

VEHICLES 2 (2010) (discussing costs and power transmission capacity).
229.

See, e.g., BETTINA KAMPMAN ET AL., CE DELFT, GREEN POWER FOR

ELECTRIC CARS 41-42 (2010) (noting the importance of recharging time for
capacity and other impacts); K. PARKS ET AL., NATL RENEWABLE ENERGY
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the costs and intrusiveness of power lines and other aspects of
electric transmission systems. 230 In short, recharging at the
most convenient times could make the electric car policy less
efficient than it would otherwise be, or worse, less efficient
than other entirely different regulatory choices such as developing different types of low carbon cars or mass transportation
systems. If instead agency officials could devise a policy to induce individuals to charge their vehicles during off-peak hours
(e.g., midnight to 7 a.m.) in many regions of the United States,
they may increase the environmental benefits of an electric vehicle fleet, decrease the costs, or both. Table 1 identifies regions
of the country in which efforts to recharge vehicles at night rather than in the evening may substantially reduce C02 levels.

LAB., COSTS AND EMISSIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC
VEHICLE CHARGING IN THE XCEL ENERGY COLORADO SERVICE TERRITORY 24

(2007) (concluding that the costs and air pollution emissions of recharging
plug-in hybrids varies substantially based on the time of charging).
230. See, e.g., Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 13,152, 13,156 (Mar. 26,
2009) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. ch. 1) ("If charging takes place during peak
periods it could require a large investment in new generation, demand response resources and/or transmission capacity to meet the resulting higher
peak loads. However, charging off-peak could actually improve the operation
of the electric system, for example by improving existing generation asset utilization or by providing an electricity storage solution to address the potential
for over-generation by variable resources in off-peak periods.").
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Table 1. Regional Variations in C02 Emissions from
Recharging2 3 '
CO (minion ton)
Region

Year: 2020
Gasolinefueled
HEVs

Year: 2030

PHEVs charged
from grid
night evening

ECAR

4.3

6.1

6.1

ERCOT

2.5

1.8

MACC

3.1

34

MAIN

3.3

MAPP
NPCC-NY

Gasoline.
fueled
HEVs

PHEVs charged
from rid
night evening

11.1

13.8

13.6

2.2

1.5

2.3

4.2

3.4

8.0

8.5

8.5

5.1

4.8

8.4

10.4

10.0

1.2

1.7

1.2

3.2

3.9

3.1

1.7

2.2

2.2

4.3

3.1

4.1

NPCC-NE

1.8

1.6

2.0

4.7

3.6

4.6

FRCC

2.1

1.6

2.3

5.5

6.4

4.6

SERC

6.0

7.5

5.4

15.4

20.7

14.3

SPP

0.8

0.6

0.8

0.5

2.2

2.1

WECC-NW
WECCRPM/ANM

1.8

1.7

1.7

4.7

3.1

3.1

1.2

1.1

0.9

3.1

4.9

3.1

WECC-CA

4.6

3.3

3.9

11.7

9.3

10.2

Total

34.4

37.7

36.9

82.1

92.2

85.5

Source
Table
13
Table
16
Table
19
Table
22
Table
25
Table
28
Table
31
Table
34
Table
37
Table
40
Table
43
Table
46
Table
49

1. Monetary Outcomes
a. The Rational Actor
If regulators assume that individuals are cost-minimizing,
rational actors, they are likely to arrive at time-of-use pricing
schemes to increase the cost of on-peak electricity use or to remove the choice from the individual by adopting a technologybased solution that controls the timing of vehicle recharging
231. Table 1 is based on data presented in STANTON W. HADLEY &
ALEXANDRA TSVETKOVA, OAK RIDGE NATL LAB., POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES ON REGIONAL POWER GENERATION 18-

19, 48-50 (2008). The regions identified in the left-hand column of the table
are as follows: ECAR-East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement;
ERCOT-Electric Reliability Council of Texas; MAAC-Mid-Atlantic Area
Council; MAIN-Mid-America
Interconnected Network; MAPP-MidContinent Area Power Pool; NPCC-NY-Northeast Power Coordinating Council/NY; NPCC-NE-Northeast Power Coordinating Council/New England;
FRCC-Florida Reliability Coordinating Council; SERC-Southeastern Electric Reliability Council; SPP-Southwest Power Pool; WECC-NW-Western
Electricity Coordinating Council/Northwest Power Pool Area; WECCRMP/ANM-Western Electricity Coordinating Council/Rocky Mountain Power
Area and Arizona-New Mexico-Southern Nevada Power Area; WECC-CAWestern Electricity Coordinating Council/California. See id. at xiv, xvi fig.ES-1
(noting that the regions are as specified by the Energy Information Administration in the Annual Energy Outlook 2007).
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without regard to the time the vehicle is plugged into the grid.
Not surprisingly, much of the initial regulatory response to the
time-of-recharge problem appears to be proceeding along these
lines. 2 3 2 Although regulatory policy directed at electric vehicle
recharging is in the early stages of development and ultimately
will involve a complex mix of federal, state, and local actions,
the initial focus appears to be on the use of price and technology to steer recharging behavior. 233 For example, some early reports on recharging appear to assume that the optimal approach is simply to increase household electricity prices during
the evening-peak-use period. 234 Other reports discuss new
technologies that will automatically shift recharging to off-peak
periods regardless of when the driver plugs the car into the recharger. 235
Our framework requires consideration of these options, but
it does not stop there. Our framework highlights the need for
regulators to consider whether individuals will have adequate
information to respond to the prices or new technologies. To
deal with information problems, regulators may use general
public information campaigns to educate consumers about variable pricing structures, although these campaigns have had
limited success. 236 Immediate feedback devices and information
distributed through trusted local sources may be more effective.
Regulators could require electric vehicle or recharger manufacturers to provide a feedback mechanism that indicates the recharging cost or cost per unit of electricity on a real-time display that is visible at the time the vehicle is charged. 237

232. See, e.g., Do You Own an Electric Vehicle (EV)?, S. CAL. EDISON, http://
www.sce.com/CustomerService/rates/residential/electric-vehicles.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2010) (offering time-of-use rates for electric vehicle users); Residential Electric Vehicle Services, L.A. DEP'T WATER & POWER, http://www

.1adwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwpOO2056.jsp (last visited Nov. 29, 2010) (offering a
discounted rate for off-peak electric vehicle charging).
233. See, e.g., Do You Own an Electric Vehicle (EV)?, supra note 232 (using
such a strategy).
234. See, e.g., HADLEY & TSVETKOVA, supra note 231, at 23 (concluding
that "simple time-of-day charging could easily place all end-of-day charging
requirements into peak periods").
235. See, e.g., id. (noting the potential for "smart chargers"); PARKS ET AL.,
supra note 229, at 8 (discussing use of timing devices to move charging to off-

peak hours).
236.

Abrahamse et al., supra note 88, at 276-77.

237. See id. at 278-81 (discussing the use of immediate feedback on motor
vehicle and residential energy use).
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Beyond ensuring that price or technology-based measures
are workable if selected, our framework opens up the possibility
of other alternatives. Utility models based on wealth considerations offer a valuable perspective, but an exclusive focus may
constrain the options to price or technology-based ones. Even
assuming a first preference for such options, additional alternatives are important for realizing the full potential of electric
cars, especially if some price- and technology-based measures
are not politically viable. In fact, there is a substantial risk of
consumer backlash against higher prices during peak periods. 238 If consumers or voters reject new pricing schemes, additional measures will be necessary, although the support for
regulatory changes and the credibility of regulators at that
point may be damaged.
Similarly, consumers have reacted negatively to the loss of
control associated with some new household technologies thus
far, 239 and similar reactions may occur if the technological options take control over the timing of recharging out of consumers' hands. For example, research on programmable thermostats has demonstrated that many individuals prefer the
manual function and ultimately use less energy when they are
able to override the automatic setting on a programmable
thermostat. 240 These findings suggest that more nuanced, behaviorally sensitive options, such as including override devices
with rechargers, may have a better chance of succeeding and
therefore increasing the benefits of electric cars.
238. See FARUQUI & WOOD, supra note 12, at 21 (suggesting both that consumers are often satisfied after being introduced to variable pricing due to
greater savings and that greater education prior to implementation may help
consumers to adopt such pricing schemes); Behr, supra note 96 (discussing
troubles with recent Maryland variable pricing and its smart meter initiative);
see also Guy R. Newsham & Brent G. Bowker, The Effect of Utility TimeVarying Pricing and Load Control Strategies on Residential Summer Peak
Electricity Use: A Review, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 3289, 3294-95 (2010) (concluding
that the effectiveness of variable pricing schemes may be improved by targeting consumers more likely to respond to such schemes and by offering them
greater support services).
239. Behr, supra note 96 (discussing troubles with even less intrusive
efforts).
240. Kempton et al., supra note 128, at 190; see also Monica J. Nevius &
Scott Pigg, Programmable Thermostats That Go Berserk? Taking a Social
Perspective on Space Heating in Wisconsin 8.233, 8.241, Paper presented at
the American Council for Energy-Efficient Economy Summer Study on Energy
Efficiency in Buildings: Washington DC (Aug. 23-28, 2000), availableat http://
www.ecw.org/ecwresults/berserk.pdf (noting that a large proportion of individuals interviewed were not interested in using the programmable features of
their thermostat, and many considered these features to be a hassle).
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b. The Extra-RationalActor
Using our framework, regulators also would consider the
research on extra-rational patterns of monetary-outcomemaximizing behavior early in the regulatory development
process. For example, individuals may place a remarkably high
value on convenience and may be willing to pay a higher price
than expected for the convenience of charging during on-peak
hours. Due to a tendency to use hyperbolic discounting, individuals may devalue the savings they will realize in their energy bills at the end of the month if they recharge at off-peak
hours. 241 To overcome these behavioral tendencies, agencies
may need to consider requiring the feedback devices and builtin delayed start mechanisms with the override capabilities discussed above. 242 It also may be valuable to provide information
on the economic implications of recharging times to new electric
vehicle owners at the time of the vehicle purchase. 243 This information could reflect the insights of behavioral work on message frames to overcome hyperbolic discounting, loss- versus
gain-frames, and other phenomena. These measures may augment the effect of the time-of-use pricing and technology
schemes at low cost, thereby increasing the net benefits of the
electric car.
2. Social Outcomes
a. The Rational Actor
If regulators focus solely on monetary outcome considerations, however, they may overlook additional means of influencing the time of charging or the use of a built-in delayed start
mechanism. The social outcome prong of our framework suggests the need to explore additional behavioral insights. In
short, individuals may be willing to incur the economic cost of
on-peak charging, but considering the social cost in their decision will change the payoff structure for many. 244 It may be
possible to design reward programs or disseminate information
in other ways to enable individuals to signal to their neighbors
241. Cf. Stern, supra note 46, at 208-09 (discussing empirical studies of
how consumers implicitly discount future values).
242. See Abrahamse et al., supra note 88, at 278-82 (discussing the effectiveness of feedback techniques on behavior).
243. See id. at 276-77 (discussing the effectiveness of information to promote proenvironmental behavior).
244. Ayres et al., supra note 163, at 14-15.
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that they are recharging at low-impact times. Descriptive norm
influences may then create increased incentives for the desired
behavior, as individuals respond to the range of reasons why
individuals tend to act the way others do. Information indicating that many others have chosen to recharge during off-peak
periods may induce some to change their behavior even if they
are not personally concerned about climate change, pollution,
or recharging costs. 245
The behavioral research (e.g., the Israeli child care study)
also suggests that regulators should take care about the content of the information provided in public information campaigns. 246 For example, for some subpopulations, providing information focused solely on price may crowd out other motives
for recharging at off-peak periods. Making individuals aware of
the social costs may change the subjective payoff structure for
individuals who are concerned about issues such as climate
change and air pollution, particularly those who identify with
environmental groups. 247 If properly targeted, this information
can reinforce economic measures and may lead to impacts that
are greater than the sum of their parts.
b. The Extra-RationalActor
In addition, if regulators recognize that individuals sometimes behave in extra-rational ways when considering social
outcomes, they may incorporate a number of steps into recharge-related regulations and policies. For example, they may
require information to be framed in ways that reduce hyperbolic discounting of the social benefits of reduced carbon and air
pollution. This may be done by framing social costs and benefits
in terms of losses rather than gains, or presenting information
in units that are meaningful to the individual (i.e., presenting
reduction in carbon emissions in units of equivalent trees
planted or the equivalent number of vehicles removed from the
road). 248 If the social benefits information is provided or primed
245. See id. (concluding that such information changed behavior in other
energy-saving contexts).
246. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 173, at 15-16 (cautioning that
the production of information to consumers does not always have the intended
consequences on behavior).
247. See Newsham & Bowker, supra note 238, at 3294-95 (arguing that
similarly targeted strategies have worked to change the behavior of these
kinds of people).
248. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 63, at 456 (noting that framing
a problem in terms of loss is more likely to change behavior).
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at the time of decisionmaking, it may prevent many individuals
from rationalizing a decision to charge during on-peak hours by
invoking cognitive dissonance over this behavior. This result
would be particularly heightened if the individual had previously committed to charge during off-peak hours, such as at
the time he or she purchased the vehicle. 249 As a result, a program that induces new electric car owners to commit to recharging at off-peak hours, even if only lightly enforced, may
have an important effect on behavior. By focusing on individuals who have just purchased an electric vehicle, a program also
may induce individuals to form new habits, including the habit
of recharging at off-peak hours or using a delayed-start mechanism. Encouraging good habits at the time a new behavior is
adopted may be far easier than seeking to undo old habits later.
B. TANKLESS WATER HEATERS

Our second case study involves the analysis of policies designed to induce individuals to purchase more efficient appliances. We consider the purchase of a tankless water heater
(TWH) here. As with the electric car example, the TWH example enables us to evaluate nearly every aspect of our framework
and to do so in the order that we envision.
1. Monetary Outcomes
a. The Rational Actor
Assuming a rational actor who considers only monetary
outcomes, the most viable policy approach may be to offset the
cost of the purchase of a TWH via tax rebates or low-interest
loans. Indeed, this approach is likely to increase adoption
among eligible households, and participation rates are likely to
increase as the size of the incentive increases. 250 The behavioral
literature emphasizes the importance of considering the information barriers and beliefs that may prevent an individual
from participating in the program and ultimately purchasing a
TWH. 251 Individuals must be aware of TWHs as a substitute for
traditional water heaters, they must be aware of this at the
249. See Abrahamse et al., supra note 88, at 275-76 (discussing the successful use of commitment techniques to alter behavior).
250. Stern, supra note 134, at 468 (discussing the success of such incentives in inducing consumers to invest in their homes).
251. Id. (cautioning that such barriers can prevent acting on socially desirable behaviors).
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time that they are looking to purchase a new water heater, and
they must be aware of the incentive programs that could subsidize the cost of this purchase. Similarly, the consumer also
must believe that the TWH will deliver the promised cost savings. This requires a level of trust in the product label, the vendor, and the individual who installs the product. 252
An incentive program that is marketed using established
marketing principleS253 will bring this product and incentive information to the consumer's attention. Additional information
that is provided at the time of purchase through product labels
and well-educated intermediaries will ensure that the consumer has the appropriate information when the decision is made.
The inclusion of reputable vendors, well-respected product
manufacturers, and a guarantee of product efficiency will increase levels of trust that the product will, in fact, achieve the
advertised monetary outcomes. 254 As consumers encounter
more and more individuals in their social interactions who have
used TWHs, levels of trust will also rise. 2 5 5 Even when the incentive package is highly attractive to the consumer, trust in
intermediaries and the program as well as product visibility
are likely to be more important influences on the individual's
decision to purchase a TWH.256 An incentive program that neglects these factors, therefore, may fail altogether or be no more
successful than a program that offers a less attractive incentive.
b. The Extra-RationalActor
Because individuals are not fully rational in their consideration of monetary outcomes, 257 they are likely to act inappropriately on information relative to the minimization of costs.
252. Id. at 467-68 (noting that credibility can be an important factor in
getting behavior to change).
253. This includes principles of product marketing as well as social marketing. For a detailed discussion of the utility of social marketing techniques, see
MCKENZIE-MOHR & SMITH, supra note 6, at 82-92.
254. For a discussion of nonmonetary factors in encouraging participation
on home efficiency incentive programs, including issues such as trust and credibility, see Stern, supra note 134, at 467-68, and Stern et al., Effectiveness of
Incentives, supra note 135, at 161-63.
255. See John M. Darley & James R. Beniger, Diffusion of EnergyConserving Innovations, 37 J. SOC. ISSUES 150, 159-66 (1981) (discussing the
role of social networks in one's decision to adopt certain technologies).
256. In fact, this is the case particularly when the incentive package is attractive. See Stern et al., Effectiveness of Incentives, supra note 135, at 162.
257. Id. at 160.
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Regulators using our framework would design information disclosure programs that recognize that an individual in the market for a new water heater may underestimate the cost of operating it or fail to consider operating costs altogether. 258 When
information about operating costs is brought to their attention
they are likely to discount those savings at a rate well above
market value because individuals tend to assign greater value
to immediate outcomes than to future outcomes. 259 Because
losses loom larger than gains in consumers' minds, they may
see greater value in avoiding a cost than achieving savings,
even when the net value is identical. 260
Agencies should not rely on consumers to process and synthesize information accurately. Well-designed labels that include information about operating costs and returns on investment will provide necessary information to assist consumers in
making decisions to maximize monetary outcomes. If the decision to purchase a hot water heater is framed as an opportunity
to avoid future losses rather than to achieve future gains, the
individual is likely to be more compelled to make the investment. 26 1 In short, the design of a label is less a matter of engineering than of behavioral science.
Agencies also should consider that consumers may assign
cognitive costs a much greater value than the estimated monetary value of those costs. 262 If the incentive program is easy to
use, the consumer is more likely to use it. Once the consumer is
made aware of the existence of an incentive to purchase a
TWH, the ease or difficulty of participating in that program
will play a surprisingly large role. 263 Consumers may be turned
off if they do not know where to go to find out the details of the
program, if they cannot easily determine their eligibility, if
258. See Stern, supra note 46, at 208-09 (discussing "anomalous" implications of consumer adoption decisions and offering possible explanations for
such decisions).
259. See Feiler & Soll, supra note 127, at 289 (concluding that consumers
ignore costs both when they are decoupled from benefits and when they are
hard to keep track of).
260. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 63, at 456.
261. See Paul C. Stern, PsychologicalDimensions of Global Environmental
Change, 43 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 269, 291 (1992) (citing S. Yates, Using Prospect
Theory to Create Persuasive Communications About Solar Water Heaters and
Insulation (Jan. 1, 1982) (unpublished doctoral dissertation) (on file with University of California, Santa Cruz)) (noting the past success of framing investment decisions in terms of loss avoidance in changing investment behavior).
262. Stern et al., Design Principles,supra note 135, at 4848.
263. Id.
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there is a large paperwork burden involved in participating, or
if they do not know where to go to purchase the product and
how to have it installed. 264 For these reasons, programs that
are simple and that regulators communicate in clear, concise,
and easy to understand language will be more successful. A
program interface that offers this information as well as accompanying information about vendors that sell TWHs and install them will encourage greater participation. Finally, a program that places the administrative burden on the vendor and
requires minimal effort of the consumer will attract more participants. 265 Regulators may find that these efforts to reduce
cognitive costs will make their program more vulnerable to
abuse; however, this drawback is likely to be outweighed by the
increased participation in the program. In short, cognitive costs
may not appear in models that examine monetary costs, but
they may be equally important to a regulatory program's success.
2. Social Outcomes
a. The Rational Actor
Because individuals seek to maximize social outcomes, factors other than direct monetary outcomes will have important
influences on their decisions. Individuals value social inclusion
and seek approval from significant others in their social environment. 26 6 Behaviors that exemplify the principles held by
those individuals and groups reap social rewards that have
great value in the calculation of expected costs and benefits. 267
For example, an individual who identifies as an environmentalist and associates with other environmentalists may gain status within his or her group by purchasing a hybrid vehicle,
which has great symbolic significance but may not necessarily
be economically cost-effective. For this reason, an individual
264. See, e.g., id. (noting the importance of low cognitive costs for effective
household energy efficiency programs).
265. Cf. id. (indicating that the less consumers have to do to effectuate a
program, the more likely it will be successful).
266. For work on social identity theory, see Henry Tajfel & John Turner,
An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 40-47 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel
eds., 1979).

267. See, e.g., JOHN C. TURNER, SOCIAL INFLUENCE 163 (1991) (noting that
people are more influenced by ingroups to which they categorize themselves as
belonging, and engage in behavior that exemplifies those ingroup norms).
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may be more likely to purchase a TWH if it is considered relevant to the principles valued by an important social group. Information that connects water heater purchases, or appliance
purchases in general, to a social identity may trigger individuals to consider the social costs and benefits of that decision in
the same way that many consider the decision to purchase a fur
coat to be a faux pas. 2 6 8
Even when the individual is not motivated by the symbolic
significance of an action, the desire to fit in with a group or to
avoid negative social attention is known to be a powerful predictor of behavior. For this reason, individuals will take steps
to fit in with those around them even when it may be inconvenient or carries an economic cost.2 6 9 By communicating information to suggest that a behavior such as a TWH purchase is
widespread or is becoming widespread (i.e., a descriptive norm),
agency officials can signal to consumers that not adopting an
action will be seen as out of the norm. Similarly, by communicating to consumers that certain behavior is disapproved of or
approved of (i.e., an injunctive norm), regulators can signal to
consumers that a behavior carries with it social costs and benefits. 2 7 0 Information provided through education campaigns or
intermediaries can communicate social norms in potentially
powerful ways.
Regulators who ignore the social costs and benefits of a behavior may cause counterproductive effects. As with electric car
recharging at off-peak periods, marketing a hot water heater
purchase as an economic decision without addressing its social
significance may inadvertently crowd out nonmonetary motives
for that decision for many individuals. Framing a decision that
was once based on social outcome maximization as one that is
based on monetary outcome maximization can trigger the consumer to consider a different set of costs and benefits that may
not produce the socially optimal outcome. 27 1 In addition, energy

268. See id. (noting that identification with an ingroup makes it more likely
for an actor to behave in conformance with group norms).
269. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 903, 915 n.41 (1996).
270. For work on normative messaging and its impact on behavior, see
Goldstein et al., supra note 162, at 482; Schultz, Changing Behavior, supra
note 162, at 36; Schultz et al., Power of Social Norms, supra note 162, at 434.
271. See Bowles, supra note 174, at 1605 (arguing that economic incentives
that induce selfishness can be counterproductive); Gneezy & Rustichini, supra
note 173, at 10 (finding that when actors frame their actions in terms of eco-
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savings realized from efficiency may be taken back if the consumer uses the monetary savings from use of a TWH on other
energy expenditures. Similarly, individuals who have adopted a
TWH may be less motivated to conserve water, and therefore
increase their shower time and hot water usage. These takeback effects may be reduced by establishing goals and providing energy-use feedback to that individual. 272 Likewise, providing comparative feedback that contrasts a household's energy
use with other efficient households may increase motivation to
curtail energy use even after new technologies have been
adopted.
b. The Extra-RationalActor
Just as there is evidence that individuals behave extrarationally in their consideration of economic costs and benefits,
extra-rational patterns also exist with respect to the goal of social outcome maximization. 273 Individuals may act to maximize
social outcomes even when they do not directly experience the
payoffs. This may occur when behavior cannot be observed by
others. 274 For this reason, the social status one would gain by
purchasing a TWH may operate even when an individual's
peers may not know about this purchase. Emphasizing the social costs and rewards associated with a behavior may have
benefits even when that person does not perform a behavior in
the public eye. 275
Individuals also may respond to a social norm that they do
not necessarily endorse due to pluralistic ignorance. 276 Although this may not be directly related to appliance purchases,
it may be highly relevant in other contexts such as decisions
regarding lawn care or the purchase of used goods. Individuals
may incorrectly believe that their peers would look down on
nomic consequences, they tend to act in ways that ignore the social consequences of those actions).
272. See Abrahamse et al., supra note 88, at 276 (discussing the successful
use of goal-setting techniques in changing behavior).
273. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
274. For example, providing normative information in energy bills led to a
reduction in energy use even though levels of energy consumption could not be
directly observed by one's peers. Ayres et al., supra note 163, at 14-15.
275. See Vandenbergh, supra note 45, at 1105-06 (suggesting that personal
norms may influence behaviors in situations where peers do not observe the
harmful behavior).
276. See Hubert J. O'Gorman, The Discovery of PluralisticIgnorance: An
Ironic Lesson, 22 J. HIST. BEHAV. ScI. 333, 333-35 (1986) (discussing pluralistic ignorance and its potential effects).
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them for choosing not to use pesticides, for purchasing a used
product, or for choosing a product based on its efficiency rather
than its appearance. 277 Information to overcome normative
misperceptions can send more accurate social signals about
what others consider acceptable or desirable behavior.
Similarly, an individual may adopt personal norms even
outside of the context of a group to reward or punish that behavior. Personal norms may be based on broader societal values such as fairness, patriotism, or environmental protection.
Individuals may choose to internalize these values as personal
norms as a function of their own disposition or personal experiences. Individuals are often motivated to act consistently with
a personal norm out of a desire for consistency or to reduce the
cognitive dissonance that results from behaving inconsistently
with a personal norm or belief. 2 7 8 A public education campaign
that makes widely held personal values or norms salient (i.e.,
energy security or environmental protection) can trigger dissonance-reducing behavior and encourage efficient investments. 279 For example, a campaign that connects TWH and
other appliance selections to environmental outcomes or energy
security may motivate individuals to invest in this product
when it is time to replace an old appliance. Furthermore, if this
message is present at the time of decisionmaking (when the individual is purchasing the appliance), it is likely to be most
successful. Requesting a commitment to purchase a more efficient water heater or other appliance the next time the individual is eligible can also prevent individuals from rationalizing or
explaining away their decision to act inconsistently with a personal norm. 280 Regulators may need to conduct these initiatives
in a more community-based approach, and the difficulties of
coordination may be outweighed by increased levels of success.
CONCLUSION
The framework that we present continues the process of
transforming behavioral insights into concrete considerations,
277. See id. at 334 (citing analogous examples).
278. John Thogerson, A Cognitive Dissonance Interpretation of Consistencies and Inconsistencies in Environmentally Responsible Behavior, 24 J.
ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 93, 94 (2004).

279. Cf. id. (indicating that individuals would prefer to act in conformance
with such norms).
280. See Abrahamse et al., supra note 88, at 275-76 (discussing commitment strategies).
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thereby enabling agencies to improve the efficacy and efficiency
of regulation. It also will discourage agencies from allowing ad
hoc considerations to reduce the rationality of regulation. More
broadly, our framework will facilitate judicial review of regulation, which is an important corrective for arbitrary agency action. In addition, it will enhance presidential and congressional
oversight, improving the political accountability of regulation.
Our framework also will enable interested parties to evaluate
the effect of behaviorally informed regulatory analysis on regulation across government and will spur further study to improve that analysis, filling gaps in our understanding of behavioral responses.
In some senses, our framework is both too complicated and
not complicated enough. It is more complicated than the existing model of regulatory analysis, but that result is inevitable
once we acknowledge the importance of behavioral insights to
effective regulation. At the same time, it does not provide a
model that will generate quantitative results or a comprehensive set of instructions on how to incorporate behavioral insights. The field is still developing and further theoretical and
applied research will need to be done. In fact, we may need a
new cross-discipline of social behavioral psychology. We also
may need sociologists and social psychologists to sit alongside
the economists within agencies and OIRA.281 In the meantime,
our framework is likely to improve the success of regulations
aimed at individual and household behavior-which is to say
much of the regulation that agencies contemplate in the regulatory state.
Likewise, our examples from the energy-use context are
not conclusive. For example, sufficient holes remain in our understanding of behavioral plasticity to warrant policies to target a host of behaviors. Individuals may be unwilling to modify
some behaviors for unanticipated reasons while others may be
more flexible. Thus, continued research and evaluation will develop our understanding of where the most cost-effective opportunities exist for agency officials to develop policies that hone in
on the most promising opportunities for emissions reductions in
the future. The limitations on the available data are not a bar
281. OIRA recently noted that it is important to use "[s]cientifically valid
experiments" along with market surveys and focus groups to test the effects of
summary disclosure, and that "[clonsultation with experts can also be a valuable supplement to focus group testing." 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra
note 5, at 5.
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to progress in this area, but rather they suggest that the use of
behavioral insights in regulatory development and review is at
an early stage of development, just as was economic analysis of
regulatory activity several decades ago.
Entering the behavioral era means looking at regulation
through a new lens. It reflects frank recognition that regulation
cannot work effectively or efficiently if it does not consider how
targeted populations respond. Cost-benefit analysis has developed through practical application and theoretical consideration, and we now know much more about the rational-actor
model on which it is based. We expect the same for behavioral
insights. By providing a framework for incorporating such insights into regulatory analysis, we aim to take a critical step in
that direction.

